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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Theory and Discretion
Maintenance law, in accord with the "no-fault" divorce movement that
swept the country in the 1970's, eliminated the "damages for fault" nature of
alimony. Gone were the necessity for the recipient to be "innocent," the re-
quirement that the obligor be "at fault," and the underlying norm that, if he
could pay, the breaching husband automatically would have to do so. The
whole of maintenance appeared to be what was formerly only a part of it: need
of the party seeking maintenance and the ability of the other to pay. A decade
of court interpretation in Missouri has confirmed this radical change.1 As one
of the earliest maintenance statutes based on the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act, the Missouri interpretations may be a paradigm for development
elsewhere. Therefore, this article utilizes the development of the new mainte-
nance law in one state, Missouri, to explore principles applicable throughout
the country.
The attitudinal change of recent years concerning equality and individual-
ism is reflected in most states' statutes, as it is in Missouri, by the elimination
* Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
I. See Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L.
1977); In re Marriage of Neubern, 535 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
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of the concept that only a wife could be entitled to alimony. Alimony law had
required individualized determinations of need and ability to pay, but it was
bottomed on the underlying stereotype that only women would need financial
help. The new maintenance creates no presumptions about either men or
women, but treats them equally in the sense that the criteria to be considered
apply to both men and women.' However, courts are not required to assume
that any particular woman possesses the equivalent earning capacity of her
husband. The purpose of maintenance is to respond to need if it exists in the
case at hand, not to create a new, unrealistic stereotype.3
Conceptual bases for maintenance are seldom addressed in court opinions,
but may, in fact, influence how attorneys and judges deal with more specific
issues. The Missouri statute4 is based on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act5 which was promulgated by the Commissioners after Professor Robert
Levy had prepared a comprehensive Preliminary Analysis for them.8 In the
Analysis,7 Levy said that a noteworthy conceptual framework for alimony was
constructed by the Task Force on Family Law and Policy which recommended
that alimony criteria should include recompense for the contributions of a
homemaker to the family's well-being which was not otherwise made (presum-
ably in property division) and that alimony should recompense for loss of earn-
ing capacity suffered by either spouse because of the marriage. Levy then rec-
ommended full support of custodians of minor children and, if property
division were insufficient, alimony for the person who had contributed substan-
tially to the marriage but had developed no earning skills. Obviously, he was
thinking of the homemaker who restricts her employment career during the
marriage in order to further the welfare of the family.
Traditional family patterns, which persist even with younger couples, allo-
cate resources for the good of the family even though utility is not maximized
for a particular individual.8 Couples choose to have wives devote full- or part-
time to homemaking and child care because they value the resulting benefits
to the family's quality of life over additional income she may have earned; if
2. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a statute
permitting alimony only to women violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. As a result alimony statutes not changed by legislation were no
longer valid.
3. In 1981 the median annual earnings of year round full-time workers in the
United States was $20,260 for men and $12,001 for women. BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 673, THE FEMALE-MALE EARNINGS GAP: A
REvIEw OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS ISSUES 9, Table 6 (1982). The 40% less earn-
ings for women was nearly the same whether college-educated or not. Id. at 2.
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.335 (1978).
5. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 494 (1973).
6. Krauskopf, Maintenance: Theory and Negotiation, 33 J. Mo. BAR 24, 28
(1977).
7. R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMI-
NARY ANALYSIS 153 (1968).
8. Smith & Beninger, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support
Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201 (1982).
[Vol. 50
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they are in the labor market, married women choose jobs that allow them to
combine homemaking with a minimum of disruption such as choosing jobs
near home and subordinating their own career development when the hus-
band's advancement requires a geographic move.9 The result in labor force
participation is that more than one-fourth of all women workers hold part-time
jobs and that the average sixteen-year-old woman now will spend 27.7 years in
the work force compared to 38.5 years for a comparable man.10 The result for
an individual woman is a drastic reduction in earning capacity due to loss of
skill development and experience, on-the-job training, and seniority. The re-
duction is an average lifetime decrease in earning capacity of 1.2% for each
year out of the labor force.11 For college-educated women, the decrease can be
as high as 4.3% each year. 12 The typical "displaced homemaker" graphically
illustrates this economic effect.' 3
An economist has characterized alimony as making up for the opportu-
nity cost of decreased earning capacity due to homemaking and has asserted it
is essential to encourage socially desirable devotion to homemaking.'4 The
homemaker contributes to the income producing spouse's welfare directly by
freeing that spouse to devote nearly all energy and time to income producing
activities. This is an especially valuable contribution when the income produc-
ing spouse desires children but cannot or will not divert time and energy from
producing income to child-rearing. Either a full-time homemaker, or one who
is "underemployed" and sacrifices career development to carrying out the pri-
mary child-rearing role, allows the other spouse to enjoy parenthood without
diluting that spouse's career and earning potential. The Colorado Supreme
Court, interpreting a statute similar to Missouri's, said it would be inequitable
to saddle the homemaker spouse with the burden of reduced earning potential
9. Id. at 204.
10. FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS 1, WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
(1982).
11. Mincer & Polachek, Women's Earnings Reexamined, 13 J. Hum. RE-
SOURCES 118, 120-21 (1978).
12. Mincer & Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of
Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 415 (T. Schultz ed. 1974).
13. VoIcEs FOR WOMEN 92, REP. OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR WOMEN (1980), states:
Employers have been unwilling to credit displaced homemakers with previous
work experience or transfer volunteer skills into remunerative employment
due to the fact that these women have been removed from the work force for
a substantial period of time. Many of these women have office skills but these
are rusty and outmoded. They have no knowledge of updated office techniques
and are too old to take advantage of many nontraditional training and ap-
prenticeship programs which have age limitations. Still others are competing
with younger, more experienced women in the traditional female job
fields-nursing, teaching, social services ..... [T]he displaced homemaker
frequently settles for a low skilled, low paying job which requires little or no
training and consequently affords only limited opportunity for upward
mobility.
14. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978).
1985]
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while allowing the other, who had been freed to develop earning capacity, to
continue in an advantageous position.18 In short, the justification for obligating
the income producing spouse with maintenance payments after the marriage
ends is that the homemaker spouse's efforts benefited the other spouse at the
expense of the homemaker. Our social system imposes the obligation through
maintenance law because society values and seeks to encourage homemaking
and child-rearing. To the extent that maintenance compensates for the long-
term adverse effects of homemaking, maintenance protects the socially valua-
ble role of homemaker.
The first Missouri opinion to recognize compensation for lost earning ca-
pacity as a function of maintenance was In re Marriage of Powers.'6 A fuller
discussion soon followed in Brueggemann v. Brueggemann.17 Numerous other
opinions have elaborated upon the purposes of maintenance as compensation
for contributions to the obligor spouse or the family and for lost earning ca-
pacity.1 8 Interestingly, the most succinct summary is in a case ruling that no
workers' compensation death benefits were payable to a divorced spouse of the
deceased worker. In Jamison v. Churchill Truck Lines,' the court said,
Marriages involve long term commitments. Spouses often detrimentally rely
on these commitments. Such reliance often requires long term remedies, such
as maintenance .... Maintenance is awarded when one spouse has detrimen-
tally relied on the other spouse to provide the monetary support during the
marriage. If the relying spouse's withdrawal from the marketplace so injures
his marketable skills that he is unable to provide for his reasonable needs
maintenance may be awarded. Maintenance provides a remedy for a spouse's
reliance.20
In sum, Missouri courts recognize that modern maintenance is based primarily
on the concept that homemaking and child-rearing are to be protected for the
good of the larger society by compensation for the contributions made and loss
of earning power incurred when the marriage ends by divorce.
A practical analysis of maintenance awards must acknowledge trial
courts' broad discretion. In Murphy v. Carron, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the judgment of the trial court in court-tried cases will be sustained
"unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the
weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erro-
15. In re Marriage of Franks, 189 Colo. 499, 508, 542 P. 2d 845, 852 (1975).
16. 527 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
17. 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
18. In re Marriage of K.B., 648 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); Niehaus v.
Niehaus, 593 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Hurley v. Hurley, 607 S.W.2d 169
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., W.D.
1979); Madden v. Madden, 585 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Kerns v. Kerns,
552 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
19. 632 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
20. Id. at 35-36.
21. 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en bane).
[Vol. 50
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neously applies the law."' 22 Review is limited to mistake of law or abuse of
discretion.23 In Diehl v. Diehl,24 the court said that the appealing party had
the burden to "show an abuse of discretion that shocks our sense of justice. 25
Increasingly, appellate courts affirm if there is any evidence at all to support
the findings, stating that no abuse of discretion exists. 26 Because the trial
courts' judgments are upheld almost routinely, inconsistent decisions on simi-
lar facts can be affirmed depending upon who appeals. The wide range of dis-
cretion given the trial courts should be kept in mind as appellate opinions are
read or discussed. At best, we can determine only the outer perimeters of lim-
its and a wide range of decisionmaking that is permissible.
B. Statutory Structure
2 7
The statute permits maintenance only if the party seeking it lacks "suffi-
22. Id. at 32.
23. Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Bull v.
Bull, 634 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 627 S.W.2d
117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Schreier v. Schreier, 625 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. App., E.D.
1981).
24. 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
25. Id. at 591.
26. Most frustrating for those trying to discern guidelines is the cryptic opinion
that sets out no facts and states no reasons for affirmance or, at most, that the evidence
is sufficient. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984);
Mason v. Mason, 560 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., Spr. 1978).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.355 (1978):
Maintenance order when jurisdiction lacked-findings required for
I. In a proceeding for nonretroactive invalidity, dissolution of marriage or
legal separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse,
the court may grant a maintenance order to either spouse, but only if it finds
that the spouse seeking maintenance
(I) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to
him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is
the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate
that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of
time as the court deems just, and after considering all relevant factors
including:
(1) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs inde-
pendently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education. or training to en-
able the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) The duration of the marriage;
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cient property to provide for his reasonable needs" and "is unable to support
himself through appropriate employment." Courts have held that these two
requirements determine eligibility for or the right to maintenance.28 Subsec-
tion (I) sets out no criteria or factors to measure "reasonable needs," to decide
whether the spouse is able to "support himself," or to assess what is "appropri-
ate employment." Subsection (2) empowers the court to determine the
amounts and time of maintenance "after considering all relevant factors" in-
cluding seven specifically listed.29 Since most of these factors are relevant to
determining financial resources and ability to earn or to measure "reasonable
needs," courts have read the two subsections together. 30 Therefore, it is appro-
priate to use the relevant factors in subsection (2) to determine "reasonable
needs" and the extent to which "property" and "appropriate employment meet
them." Among the factors listed in subsection (2), the two pertinent only to
amounts and duration are ability of the obligor to pay while meeting his own
needs and conduct of the party seeking maintenance.
Prior to the new legislation, a statute31 had provided for in gross alimony,
a certain sum of money to be paid in a lump sum or in installments. This
statute was not repealed and the new legislation said nothing about in gross
payments. Early decisions under the 1974 law clarified that in gross mainte-
nance was authorized, 32 and could be ordered in conjunction with periodic
maintenance. 33 After a few lump sum orders were modified on appeal to allow
installment payments,34 trial courts began to order in gross maintenance paya-
ble in installments.35 Trial courts next ordered a specific amount of money to
be paid periodically for a certain number of installments or a certain length of
time. 38 In 1983, the Missouri Supreme Court held that durational or time lim-
(6) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(7) The conduct of a party seeking maintenance during the marriage.
28. Brown v. Brown, 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
29. See supra note 27.
30. Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977);
In re Marriage of Sharp, 539 P.2d 1306 (Colo. App. 1975).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.080 (1969).
32. Carr v. Carr, 556 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); D.E.W. v. M.W., 552
S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Miller v. Miller, 553 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1977); In re Marriage of Dickey, 553 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
33. Sawtell v. Sawtell, 569 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
34. D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Broyles v.
Broyles, 555 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
35. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Royal
v. Royal, 617 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (rev'd for lack of evidence); In re
Marriage of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
36. By 1982, each division of the appellate court had upheld a durational limit:
Kerns v. Kerns, 552 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 605
S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (modified); In re Marriage of Daniel, 639 S.W.2d
650 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982). However, many cases have been reversed for insufficient
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ited maintenance was the same in nature as maintenance in gross and section
452.335.2 authorized all three payment forms.3' The court said, "Section
452.335 thus covers the full range of support payments to a spouse, mainte-
nance for an indefinite term, maintenance for a limited period and mainte-
nance in gross."'38 The need requirements of section 452.335.1 must be met to
justify any of these forms of maintenance.3 9
II. AWARDING OR DENYING MAINTENANCE
A. Basis to Award or Deny
1. Reasonable Needs
a. The Standard for Need
The bellwether case on the concept of reasonable needs is Brueggemann v.
Brueggemann. The court stated that to proceed logically, the trial judge
must make a threshold determination of reasonable needs of the spouse seek-
ing maintenance. The statute has a new emphasis on the self-sufficiency of
both parties following dissolution, but Brueggemann said that does not require
ignoring that a marriage did exist:
In many marriages by tacit or express agreement, the wife remains at home
and cares for the children and foregoes her opportunity to develop a career or
acquire job experience. Where such a spouse has been out of the job market
for extended periods, an independent determination of her appropriate life-
style and earning capacities may be difficult or impossible. In such a case it
may be proper for the court to place greater emphasis on the lifestyle enjoyed
during the marriage, the duration of the marriage and other traditional fac-
tors .... "[R]easonable needs" as used in the statute does not automatically
equal the standard of living established during the marriage. Reasonable
needs is a relative term. In a marriage of lengthy duration where one spouse
has foregone career development, the marital standard of living may serve as
an important guide in computing the spouse's reasonable needs. In a very
practical sense it is frequently the best evidence of what the parties have to-
gether determined their "reasonable needs" to be.4
Mrs. Brueggemann had been a homemaker for thirty-one years, only be-
ing employed a few years before the dissolution in order to help pay for the
children's college education. She earned barely one-third that of Mr. Brueg-
gemann. Their marriage standard of living was set modestly by his $15,000
37. Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
38. Id. at 800.
39. Walker v. Walker, 631 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Merrit v. Mer-
rit, 616 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981); Daus v. Daus, 595 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1979); Shroder v. Shroder, 552 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
40. 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
41. Id. at 857 (citation and footnote omitted); accord Phelps v. Phelps, 620
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
2651985]
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annual net income and the $5,500 annually she had earned since the children
started college. Mrs. Brueggemann's expense statement for herself and child
totaled $10,300. The court reduced her monthly reasonable needs by the
amount the husband paid on the mortgage. The court recognized that her rea-
sonable needs exceeded her income. Thus, the import of the court's analysis is
that, if a person has been hindered by homemaking in developing earning ca-
pacity, then reasonable needs may well exceed what can be earned. The longer
the duration of the marriage and devotion to homemaking, the more the mar-
riage service will have lessened earning capacity. The standard of living during
the marriage, rather than the standard one is able to maintain independently,
is more and more an appropriate measure of reasonable needs as the marriage
duration is longer and longer.42
The marriage standard of living as a measure of reasonable needs is
equally applicable to a wealthy scale of living. In re Marriage of Morris43
involved a husband who earned over $100,000 a year, owned two homes, two
country club memberships and several investments. The marriage had lasted
nearly twenty-five years during which Mrs. Morris had adopted and raised
Mr. Morris' child. She was fifty years old with only a high school education
and no particular employable skills. She had been awarded $75,000 in non-
income-producing property, $10,000 lump sum maintenance, and $1,500 a
month periodic maintenance. The appellate court held that insufficient weight
had been given to the marital standard of living, citing the Florida condomin-
ium with its golf club facilities and other related expenses as the parties' well-
established lifestyle. Mrs. Morris had indicated expenses of $2,567 a month
and requested $3,500 a month to cover her income tax liability on the mainte-
nance payments. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable amount for
monthly maintenance would be $1,900. Many similar decisions from all the
appellate districts have upheld substantial awards because of the high stan-
dard of living during a long marriage. 44 It should be noted, however, that even
these awards are not likely to enable the recipient to maintain that former
high standard. Mrs. Morris, for example, had indicated needs of $2,567 a
month without considering income tax liability, but eventually obtained only
$1,900 a month.
42. Accord Childers v. Childers, 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); In re
Marriage of K.B., 648 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); Pederson v. Pederson, 599
S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
43. 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
44. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Childers v.
Childers, 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Bull v. Bull, 634 S.W.2d 228 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1982); In re Marriage of Deatherage, 595 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. App., S.D.
1980); C.B.H. v. R.N.H., 571 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Butcher v.
Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); D.M.S. v. P.E.S., 526 S.W.2d 361
(Mo. App., K.C. 1975); cf. Blount v. Blount, 674 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984)
(removing time limit on $2200 a month); In re Marriage of Pitluck, 616 S.W.2d 861
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (reversing inadequate amount); In re Marriage of Powers, 527
S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975) (same).
[Vol. 50
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/2
MAINTENANCE
Later cases have been careful to enunciate that the pre-dissolution stan-
dard of living is not mandated automatically as the sole measure of reasonable
needs.4 5 However, the emphasis on utilizing the marriage standard of living
continues when the marriage was lengthy. 4" In contrast, there is strong lan-
guage that the ex-spouse from a short marriage ordinarily is not expected to
continue to support the other.47
There is almost no appellate guidance as to what are or are not reasona-
ble ongoing or recurring needs other than what is appropriate to the standard
of living approved as acceptable. Ordinarily, the petitioner for maintenance
files an expense statement listing every possible category of expense that has
been incurred in the recent past and on the basis of those past expenses, esti-
mates future needs. One of the few decisions disallowing an expense was
Fausett v. Fausett,48 which held that contributions to savings accounts and
depreciation of personal property were not reasonable expenses. The court
said,
the ultimate goal [of the Dissolution of Marriage Act] is to place each of the
former spouses in an independent, self-sufficient status. Creating a future es-
tate or preserving marital property intact from the ravages of use and time
under the guise of maintenance are at war with both the literal meaning of
'maintenance' and the conceptual theories undergirding the Dissolution of
Marriage Act.49
Items normally included are: house payment or rent; property insurance and
real estate taxes; property maintenance; clothing acquisition and cleaning,
food, medical and dental expenses and insurance costs; transportation costs
including car payments, insurance and licensing; entertainment; pets; furniture
and household goods; tools and appliances and their maintenance; gifts; contri-
butions to church and charities; club or organization memberships; magazine
and newspaper subscriptions; and costs of babysitter and household help.
Lack of evidence of need is the most common basis for the rare reversal
of a maintenance award. 50 A petitioner ordinarily must present an income and
45. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 627 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982);
Hauser v. Hauser, 625 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
46. Compare Childers v. Childers, 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (13
years long) with Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (6 years
long). See also Schreier v. Schreier, 625 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Madden
v. Madden, 585 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (marriage of 35 years).
47. See cases discussed, infra, Section III. Durational Limits.
48. 661 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
49. Id. at 618.
50. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 667 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984); Trunko v.
Trunko, 642 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Horridge v. Horridge, 618 S.W.2d
202 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Fastnacht v. Fastnacht, 616 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. App., W.D.
1981); Merritt v. Merritt, 616 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981); Abney v. Abney,
575 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Shroder v. Shroder, 552 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1977); Horridge v. Horridge, 542 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); cf
Givens v. Givens, 599 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
1985]
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expense statement and testimony to establish needs. However, the other
spouse's testimony may establish the needs of both spouses by showing the
past expenses of both."' The appellate court will allow a fair margin of error
when the amount ordered appears to exceed the petitioner's need as indicated
by the evidence. 52
b. Specific or Temporary Needs
i. Paying off debts
The need to liquidate debts supports an in gross maintenance award when
the obligor spouse had been partly responsible for the debts. D.E.W. v. M.W.53
illustrates well the petitioning spouse who had loaned money to the other
spouse or who had borrowed money for the other spouse only to see it frittered
away or lost in unfortunate business adventures. Petitioner was not able to
provide for her own needs and continue payments on the debts she had in-
curred for the husband's benefit. She requested and was awarded $10,000 to
pay off the debts. In Broyles v. Broyles,5' another court recognized a similar
equity where the wife had invested significant amounts of separate property in
a marital trucking venture which failed. Both spouses had financial difficulties
and illnesses, but her financial losses were greater and at the time of trial she
was not earning due to an auto accident. She needed the $5,000 to enable her
to pay debts accumulated in their joint ventures. The court described her pre-
sent indebtedness as contrasting dramatically with her comfortable financial
status just prior to the marriage. Although the wife in McCully v. McCully55
had not invested her separate funds, she had been a homemaker for twenty-
five years and innocently had signed joint debts, some in blank, at the insis-
tence of the husband. When he was discharged in bankruptcy, she was left
solely responsible and was without means to pay them. In Gunkel v. Gunkel,56
the award was enough to enable the petitioner to pay the loan balance on a
mobile home she was awarded in the property division.
These decisions have two important characteristics. First, the recipient
needed the requested funds in order to pay the debts and meet her other rea-
sonable needs. Second, since the recipient had requested only a lump sum
amount, no question was raised concerning the possible insufficiency of the in
gross amount to meet needs. Presumably, the amount was adequate or the
51. C.B.H. v. R.N.H., 571 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); see also Ka-
lish v. Kalish, 624 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981) (award for more maintenance
than asked for supported by evidence); Rickard v. Rickard, 616 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 198 1) (evidence supported maintenance even though 19-year-old wife testified that
she could take care of herself).
52. Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
53. 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
54. 555 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
55. 550 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
56. 633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
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recipient would have requested more; the obligor appealed and the court held
it was proper to impose an obligation for lump sum maintenance.17
ii. Maintenance requested for education or training
Missouri courts have recognized educational or training expenses such as
college, nursing school, cosmetology school, or secretarial schools as a reasona-
ble need even for a spouse in a relatively short marriage.5 8 The statute in
subsection 2 includes as a relevant factor in setting maintenance the time nec-
essary to acquire sufficient educational training to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate employment.59 This is consistent with the per-
ceived emphasis on self-sufficiency in the new legislation. These cases establish
that rehabilitative maintenance may be awarded even after a marriage so
short that no other form of maintenance would have been justified. 0 The lead-
ing researcher on the effect of alimony awards has urged strongly that tempo-
rary maintenance to younger women for training be ample and lengthy enough
to provide significant improvement in income-producing ability.61 Her reason-
ing is that subsidization of education adequate to produce a high level of self-
sufficiency will have long range positive consequences for society and for the
parties and their children. Otherwise, the former homemaker, desperate to
earn something quickly, plunges into a low paying job from which she is never
able to escape.
iii. Maintenance for restitution
A handful of decisions defy categorization of maintenance as within rea-
sonable needs for day-to-day support, but rather could fall within the broader
purpose mentioned by Levy: recompense for contributions to the welfare of the
57. An interesting example is Elliott v. Elliott, 621 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1981). The wife apparently had requested periodic maintenance but was given
$15,500 in gross. Only the husband appealed. The opinion analyzed the evidence which
established her need for at least that much. She did not question on appeal whether the
award was not a sufficient amount. See also In re Marriage of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Miller v. Miller, 553 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
For the contrasting situation where the obligor requested a limit on the amount or
duration of the maintenance, see infra Section III. Durational Limits.
58. In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); In re
Marriage of Gardner, 636 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); In re Marriage of
G.B.S., 641 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Cole v. Cole, 633 S.W.2d 263 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1982); Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980);
Raines v. Raines, 583 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); cf. Goffv. Goff, 557 S.W.2d
55 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
59. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.335.2(2) (1978).
60. In Raines v. Raines, 583 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979), for ex-
ample, the marriage had been viable for only 15 to 18 months.
61. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
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family which otherwise have not been compensated.62 One of these is Harris v.
Harris63 where the husband dissipated the wife's portion of proceeds from the
sale of the family home which they had agreed to share equally. The appellate
court upheld an in gross maintenance award for the amount of the wife's
share, saying that it merely was carrying out their agreement. There was no
discussion of whether the funds were needed for day-to-day living expenses.
Since the wife was a registered nurse employed for many years, it seems un-
likely. The court did not consider that necessary to uphold the award. Instead,
the maintenance in gross appeared to be restitutionary. It served the equitable
purpose of fulfilling her reasonable expectations while preventing unjust en-
richment to him by restoring her share of the proceeds." Maintenance was
used as a remedy for her reliance. Within the meaning of the statute one could
say that her reasonable need was to be compensated for the funds. However,
the justice of the result apparently was so obvious that the court gave it no
discussion.
In a similar case, the husband had obtained unconscionably the wife's
assent to a separation agreement providing they would share equally payment
of a $15,000 debt to the wife's mother.6 5 There was evidence that the husband
never intended to pay and, when enforcement was threatened, he filed for
bankruptcy. The appellate court affirmed, setting aside the separation agree-
ment and the decree which incorporated it and entering an order for in gross
maintenance of $9,900. The original decree had given the wife $2,400. The
added $7,500 is exactly the amount the husband had promised to pay. There
was no discussion of either her need for the money for living expenses or of the
purpose for the award, but the justice of giving her an added $7,500 is pat-
ent. 6 Although the court said it merely was enforcing their contract, the hus-
band had benefited from the money borrowed initially and would benefit from
the wife paying his share to the creditor. That is the benefit he had to restore
to the wife in order to avoid unjust enrichment. Once again, avoidance of un-
just enrichment and honoring reasonable expectations appear legitimate pur-
poses for maintenance in gross.
6 7
62. R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMI-
NARY ANALYSIS 153 (1968).
63. 670 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
64. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937); Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing Spouse's Education" Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in
Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 391 (1980).
65. In re Marriage of Bartlett, 664 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984).
66. Whether the judicial goal of avoiding the effects of bankruptcy is permissi-
ble under federal bankruptcy law is another question.
67. See also In re Marriage of Dickey, 553 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977),
where the court entered a judgment for $75,000 in gross maintenance after husband's
answer had been struck twice for failure to conduct discovery.
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iv. Recompense for contribution to spouse's education
Nationwide, an equitable award, either of maintenance or under the
court's inherent equity power without regard to statutory maintenance or
property division, is used increasingly to recompense the spouse who was em-
ployed in order to further the graduate or professional education of the student
spouse. 8 As early as 1976 appellate courts in Missouri approved taking into
account contributions to the acquisition of education when deciding division of
the marital property. 9 However, when the marriage breaks up shortly after
the advanced degree is acquired, there is usually insufficient marital property
to compensate justly. Neither has there been time to share the advantages of
the increased earning capacity and the concomitant higher standard of living
that it permits. Courts of other states have granted "reimbursdment ali-
mony"70 or an equitable award in order to honor the contributing spouse's
expectations of sharing in the increased earning capacity and to prevent unjust
enrichment to the educated spouse.71 The method for measuring the amount of
compensation varies.
72
In two leading decisions, Missouri courts have approved monetary awards
to the contributing spouse in this situation. The trial court in Lowrey v. Low-
rey73 granted $550 per month for five years to a wife who had worked as a
nurse during four years of the husband's dental schooling, thereby providing
$58,000 to support the marriage. $550 a month for five years is $33,000 which
probably is close to the wife's contributions minus her own living expenses for
the time her husband was in school. The trial court commented in regard to
the maintenance order that both parties were in good health and could support
themselves at "subsistence and then some" but that the wife's contribution
toward her husband's attaining his degree in dentistry was a factor taken into
68. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984);
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf,
677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982) (dicta);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); see also Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28
U. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980).
69. In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
70. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
71. See authorities cited supra, note 64.
72. Four different methods, used alone or in conjunction, are explained in Hau-
gan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211-14, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802-03 (1984), as: (1) cost
value or contribution in money and service (minus the employee's own living expenses);
(2) opportunity costs, e.g., the lowered standard of living during the education period
caused by lack of income from the student spouse and any lost opportunities for educa-
tion or better employment which the employed spouse suffered; (3) expected return on
investment, i.e., just share of present value of the enhanced earning capacity of the
educated spouse; (4) labor theory of value, i.e., a share of the present value of the
enhanced earning capacity equivalent to the number of years contributed.
73. 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
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consideration in setting the maintenance. The trial judge stated that the sepa-
ration occurred when the earning capacity had not been realized to the extent
of accumulating assets. He found with regard to the relative position of the
parties that the wife "is entitled to maintenance, but that entitlement in some
respects is tied to, I suppose, a theory of recoupment concerning the invest-
ment that she made from her earnings towards the Respondent being put in a
position to obtain a professional position. 174 He said he was going to order
maintenance for a time to put the wife in a whole or even position with regard
to the energies and assets she contributed to the marriage and to the respon-
dent. Unfortunately, the appellate opinion did not rule on the appropriateness
of compensation for contribution to education as a reasonable need for mainte-
nance. The wife had testified that she earned $947 net monthly, her itemized
expenses were $1,510, and she expected salary increases at regular intervals.
The husband appealed. It was easy for the appellate court to affirm, stating
that the award of maintenance was based upon her need to close the gap be-
tween her income and her monthly expenses until the expected increase in
income occurred. It concluded, "Once the trial judge found the requirements
of § 452.335.1 to be satisfied, he could consider . . . other relevant factors
including contributions toward the development of the spouse's special earning
capacity in determining the amount of the maintenance to be awarded. 17 5 The
appellate court did not state how the contributions could be relevant. Perhaps,
the current gap between income and expenses would not exist if she had the
$33,000 which she previously had contributed to him. The case would be anal-
ogous to those in which the wife had loaned money to the husband or had
become solely obligated on their jointly acquired debts and maintenance was
ordered to enable her to meet expenses while paying off the debts.76 At most,
the decision holds that recompense for contribution to education is proper
when the evidence establishes a need for maintenance to meet day-to-day liv-
ing expenses. 77
In two ways Scott v. Scott7 8 was a significant new development in Mis-
souri law. First, it upheld an award for having contributed to the other's edu-
cation without regard to the recipient's need for day-to-day living expenses.
Second, it held that the award need not be categorized as either property divi-
sion or as maintenance. Thus, it authorized an equitable award apart from
statutory authority. Scott involved a less than ten year marriage in which
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 161.
76. See supra, notes 64-67.
77. Numerous Missouri opinions state in dicta that a proper factor to consider
in awarding maintenance is contribution to the obligor spouse's earning capacity or
education. See, e.g., Schreier v. Schreier, 625 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981);
Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Mo. App., E.D. (1980); Hull v. Hull, 591
S.W.2d 376, 382 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); see also Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329
(Ky. 1985) (under a similar statute using the acquired education to establish the stan-
dard of living).
78. 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
[Vol. 50
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/2
MAINTENANCE
there were three children and had been employed throughout the husband's
law schooling. She had contributed $17,400 in wages and $14,500 in separate
property to their support during that time. She also had contributed the re-
mainder of her separate property to the down-payment on the family home.
Additionally, the wife's family had made substantial gifts. The husband, in
contrast, still had untouched non-marital property of at least $18,900. After
giving the wife most of the modest marital property, the trial court awarded
her $12,000, which it labeled a "property settlement," and maintenance of
$400 a month for four months and $200 a month for forty-four months. The
evidence showed monthly expenses of $1,600 and that she could earn up to
$12,000 a year. If the child support payments of $440 a month were added to
$200 a month maintenance and $1,000 a month earnings, wife's expenses
would be met fully.
The appellate court in Scott disapproved the label of "property settle-
ment" on the $12,000 award and looked at its substance, saying, "It is neces-
sary to consider the enhanced prospects of the husband by reason of his pro-
fessional education. The wife made the contribution to the education ... but
she will not be around for the anticipated harvest." 9 The court first referred
to the Michigan decision in Moss v. Moss8" as an "appealing approach." It
described Moss as involving a lump sum alimony award to a wife who at the
time of the divorce was earning more than the husband (who had just finished
medical school) and "normally would not be entitled to maintenance." The
Missouri court quoted favorably from the Moss opinion to the effect that the
award represented the wife's contribution to the acquisition of the husband's
medical degree. The Scott court thereby approved of maintenance as appropri-
ate to meet the reasonable need of compensation for the educational contribu-
tion even though there was no need for money for day-to-day living expenses.
However, the court avoided holding that statutory maintenance in Missouri
could serve such a purpose. Instead, it discounted the necessity of compensat-
ing by the lump sum maintenance approach. The court of appeals held that it
is better not "to hamstring our trial courts by confining them to a marital
property theory or a lump sum maintenance theory or any other particular
approach." ' The court stated that trial courts have flexibility to fashion their
decrees to meet the variety of circumstances presented by the cases. Although
the court in affirming the $12,000 award spoke favorably of the lump sum
maintenance in Moss, it clearly held that a non-labeled equitable award is
appropriate to compensate for contribution to a spouse's education.
These decisions are consistent with the nationwide trend granting com-
pensation for contribution to the other spouse's education in order to honor
expectations of sharing in the rewards of an advanced degree and to prevent
unjust enrichment of the spouse who has acquired the increased earning
79. Id. at 196.
80. 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978).
81. 645 S.W.2d at 197.
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ability.
2. Inability to Provide for Self
Since the earliest decisions, Missouri courts have been consistent in hold-
ing that section 452.335.1 precludes the grant of maintenance unless the re-
questing party lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and
is unable to support herself through appropriate employment.8 2 Occasionally, a
court asserts affirmatively that if neither property nor employment are suffi-
cient to meet needs, then maintenance is appropriate. 3 The court must then
decide the amounts and time of maintenance.84
a. Property to Provide for Reasonable Needs
Section 452.335.1 authorizes maintenance only if the party seeking it
lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs. This means all
property must be considered, both separate property and the share of marital
property which has been awarded.8 5 For this reason the division of property
should be completed before the court considers maintenance. 6 The amount of
property received in division has been a relevant factor in determining mainte-
nance in many cases.8 7
There is no obligation to consume non-income producing property, espe-
cially the family home, to produce funds to meet reasonable needs.8  Of
82. Royal v. Royal, 617 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Rickard v. Rick-
ard, 616 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Jackson, 592 S.W.2d
875 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Badalamenti, 566 S.W.2d 229 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1978); Beckman v. Beckman, 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976);
Seelig v. Seelig, 540 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
83. Steffan v. Steffan, 597 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
84. Horridge v. Horridge, 618 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
85. State ex rel. Horridge v. Pratt, 563 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
86. Spicer v. Spicer, 585 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Shroder v.
Shroder, 552 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
87. Roberts v. Roberts, 652 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983) (denial af-
firmed); Boone v. Boone, 637 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (affirmed $90 less
than need in maintenance because property sufficient); Moseley v. Moseley, 642
S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982) (affirmed $500 maintenance because with income
from $100,000 property received in division needs met); Merritt v. Merritt, 616 S.W.2d
585 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981); Metts v. Metts, 625 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981)
(denial of maintenance affirmed).
88. Fausett v. Fausett, 661 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983); Miller v.
Miller, 635 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); In re Marriage of Arnold, 632
S.W.2d 28 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); Steffan v. Steffan, 597 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980); Miranda v. Miranda, 596 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); In re Mar-
riage of Lindenfelser, 596 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980); In re Marriage of
Brewer, 592 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Arp v. Arp, 572 S.W.2d 232 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1978); Goff v. Goff, 557 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Broyles v.
Broyles, 555 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); In re Marriage of Schulte, 546
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
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course, non-income producing property is considered to the extent that it does
supply needs. For example, the mortgage-free family home would meet the
major need of housing.89 Otherwise, non-income producing property is not con-
sidered in determining ability to provide for one's own needs.9"
The focus is on income-producing property.91 Denial of maintenance has
been affirmed when an income-producing business was awarded to the request-
ing spouse.92 Numerous opinions have noted that receipt or ownership of in-
come-producing property was an appropriate factor in making the mainte-
nance award.93 On the other hand, arguments that receipt of property through
division necessarily precludes maintenance are wholly unsuccessful. If both in-
come from property and income from employment are insufficient to meet rea-
sonable needs, maintenance may be ordered.9'
b. Supporting Self Through Appropriate Employment
i. Duty to seek employment
One of the most important changes in the divorce reform legislation of
1974 is the affirmative obligation to seek employment. Section 452.335.1 cre-
ates this obligation by providing that maintenance may be ordered only when
the spouse seeking maintenance is unable to support herself through appropri-
ate employment.95 If an individual is able to do so, she is required to support
herself in employment corresponding to her skills and interests.96 In Givens v.
Givens,97 an unusual reversal of an award of maintenance to the wife occurred
because she was employed and had testified that she could support herself.98
89. Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
90. Abney v. Abney, 575 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
91. Arp v. Arp, 572 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978); D.E.W. v. M.W., 552
S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
92. In re Marriage of Neubern, 535 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
93. Boone v. Boone, 637 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Lowrey v. Low-
rey, 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Steffan v. Steffan, 597 S.W.2d 880 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
94. Moseley v. Moseley, 642 S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982) (affirmed
$100,000 income producing property and $500 monthly maintenance); Smith v. Smith,
586 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (affirmed $111,000 income-producing property
and $500 monthly maintenance).
95. Madden v. Madden, 585 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Brueggemann
v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
96. In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
97. 599 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
98. But see Rickard v. Rickard, 616 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981), af-
firming award of $30 per week maintenance even though wife testified she was able to
take care of herself and did not require husband's assistance. In Rickard, the wife was
18 or 19 years old, had custody of their one-year-old child, and was dependent upon
public assistance. The public assistance, the baby, and absence of any evidence of her
employability outweighed her testimony and supported the trial court's finding that she
could not support herself adequately. There has been no discussion in Missouri of a
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Another rare reversal in Goodrich v. Goodrich9 was based on insufficient evi-
dence of need to support the award. The evidence established only a three year
marriage without children, and that the wife who sought maintenance was
healthy and gainfully employed, earning more than the husband.
ii. Earning ability vs. temporary condition
Temporary unemployment may not establish sufficient inability to support
oneself. In Hurley v. Hurley,100 the court held that a relatively young (age
thirty-two) woman in good health with ordinarily employable skills as a medi-
cal secretary and dental assistant appropriately was denied maintenance from
her ex-spouse of ten years even though she had been unemployed and seeking
work for three months in two different states. The court noted that she had
been employed recently and was drawing unemployment compensation. 0 ' The
decision is consistent with other statements that prior employment and future
prospects will be taken into account in determining present ability to support
oneself.10 2 On the other hand, it is not an abuse of discretion to grant mainte-
nance to a spouse who has not been employed for some time but who has a
college education or recently has acquired an advanced education. 0 3 The key
differentiating factor may be the length of time the spouse seeking mainte-
nance has been out of the employment market to serve as a full-time home-
maker. The Hurley court mentioned that maintenance is most often granted to
the homemaker who has lost her opportunity to develop occupational skills,""'
or that it is granted for the purpose of education to increase employment skills.
The difference between Hurley and the situation where the homemaker just
has acquired the new education is that the latter has had no opportunity to
demonstrate that she, in fact, is employable, i.e., has an earning capacity.
Therefore, the same court which denied maintenance to Mrs. Hurley who had
been unemployed for three months may grant it to a homemaker who not yet
has obtained a job. 0 5
public policy preferring imposition of maintenance obligations over dependence on the
public purse for needy ex-spouses. Such a preference, at least in long-term situations,
seems inherent in the statute.
99. 667 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984).
100. Hurley v. Hurley, 607 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
101. But see Rickard, 616 S.W.2d at 95.
102. Tygett v. Tygett, 639 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (evidence mustjustify inference that wife will realize expectation of employment); Nunn v. Nunn, 644
S.W.2d 370 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Metts v. Metts, 625 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App., E.D.
1981) (affirmed denial of maintenance where wife received $251,900 in property divi-
sion, was healthy and had been employed during the marriage as an executive secretary
for an insurance company, had a real estate license, and had kept books for their
corporations).
103. Geldmeier v. Geldmeier, 669 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); Goff v.
Goff, 557 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
104. Hurley v. Hurley, 607 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
105. See also Atchison v. Atchison, 636 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982)
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iii. Party seeking maintenance presently employed
In most cases involving homemakers who previously had not been em-
ployed full-time during the marriage, the amount of their earnings at the time
of marriage dissolution does not meet their reasonable needs. Consideration of
only a few cases dramatizes the severe loss of earning capacity by virtue of
being out of the labor force for an extended period.' 06 Consequently, it has
been held error to exclude the wife's testimony that she had been a home-
maker during her marriage.Y0 7 This also explains why awards of maintenance
to former homemakers who now are employed usually are affirmed if the obli-
gor spouse can afford to make the payments. Some decisions treat evidence
that expenses exceed income as sufficient in itself to avoid an abuse of discre-
tion in awarding maintenance. 08 Many courts recognize the function of main-
tenance as "meeting the gap" between what the spouse is able to produce and
her reasonable needs.'0 9 No decisions were found affirming a total denial of
($20 a week "presumptively" correct where young wife with baby and without high
school education has sought employment for six months).
106. See, e.g., Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(49-year-old wife after 22 years raising five children had two part-time jobs as recep-
tionist and secretary, working 45 hours a week for $430 a month); Geil v. Geil, 647
S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (husband had discouraged wife from employment
during 25 year marriage; since separation 47-year-old wife had tried unsuccessfully to
obtain employment and was enrolled in typing and data processing classes); Klinge v.
Klinge, 554 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (55-year-old wife after 28 years and
four children was earning $400 a month at two part-time jobs as receptionist and sub-
stitute teacher); LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (38-
year-old wife after 16 years in home obtained employment as clothing salesperson after
dissolution proceedings began and testified she worked 9 hours and earned $4); In re
Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975) (12 year marriage; court
recognized failure to develop earning capacity in lengthy marriage). See discussion,
supra, at notes 6-12.
107. Toomey v. Toomey, 636 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.) (en banc) (homemaker during
all of two marriages to the husband), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1106 (1982). See Kraus-
kopf, Applying the Maintenance Statute, 33 J. Mo. BAR 93, 99 (1977) (suggesting that
evidence tending to show that a particular person's service to the marriage has lessened
her earning capacity should be introduced including numbers of children, extent of
homemaking, jobs or education relinquished, complete employment history showing
breaks and lack of seniority).
108. Lewis v. Lewis, 637 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Atchison v. Atchi-
son, 636 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Roth v. Roth, 620 S.W.2d 454 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1981); Steffan v. Steffan, 597 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
109. Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Fausett
v. Fausett, 661 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983); In re Marriage of K.B., 648
S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (20 year homemaker employable as dental hygien-
ist; husband dentist); Childers v. Childers, 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983)
(wife earned $553 a month as secretary; $1,300 a month maintenance affirmed); Mc-
Knight v. McKnight, 638 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982) (affirmed $450 a month
maintenance to wife who earned $445 a month); Weant v. Weant, 622 S.W.2d 789
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (wife held two jobs each earning only slightly over minimum
wage); Maynard v. Maynard, 601 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Viers v. Viers,
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maintenance to a long-term homemaker when this gap existed and the obligor
could fill it without sacrificing his own livelihood. In other words, ability to
hold a job is not a reason for denying maintenance. 110
iv. Lack of marketable skills
Missouri courts consistently recognize that "appropriate" employment is
that which corresponds to the skills, education, and training of the person
seeking maintenance." 1 Lack of marketable skills severely limits appropriate
employment for many longtime homemakers. The "displaced homemaker" can
be healthy, intelligent, and eager to enter the employment market but not be
able to acquire positions adequate to meet reasonable needs because no em-
ployable skills have been developed." 2 Lack of marketable skills and education
is often mentioned as an appropriate factor in awarding maintenance."' This
factor is most significant for a long-term homemaker, especially when she is
forty-five or more years old at the time of dissolution. The lack of skills due to
long service in the home and the current inability to acquire skills and job
seniority render this the most demanding case for maintenance." 4
600 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41
(Mo. App., Spr. 1977) ($375 maintenance affirmed; court said work could supple-
ment); In re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976) (maintenance
of $200 month affirmed to wife earning $138 a month).
110. The dicta in Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 669 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., E.D.
1984), that maintenance could have been refused entirely is not substantiated by prece-
dent. See discussion, infra, Section III. Durational Limits. Recent denials affirmed in
the eastern district appear not to involve long-term, full-time homemakers. See, e.g.,
Wachter v. Wachter, 645 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Worley v. Worley, 615
S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
111. In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
112. VOICES FOR WOMEN 92, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE FOR WOMEN (1980). See, e.g., P.L.K. v. R.J.K., 682 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App., W.D.
1984).
113. Diehl v. Diehl, 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984) (wife could not even
drive); In re Marriage of Runez, 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (wife's Eng-
lish limited); Bell v. Bell, 641 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Moseley v. Mose-
ley, 642 S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); In re Marriage of Pitluck, 616 S.W.2d
861 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1980) (had not completed grade school); Maynard v. Maynard, 601 S.W.2d 649
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Niehaus v. Niehaus, 593 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980);
In re Marriage of L., 548 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); In re Marriage of
Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); In re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d
885 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
114. See, e.g., Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)(49-year-old wife after 22 years in the home earning $430 a month working 45 hours a
week as secretary and receptionist); Diehl v. Diehl, 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D.
1984) (wife unemployed during 20 year marriage); Jones v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 483
(Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (50 year marriage, wife never employed outside home); Geil v.
Geil, 647 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (47-year-old wife after 25 years in the
home unable to obtain employment and enrolled in typing and data processing classes;
husband had discouraged employment during marriage); Felkner v. Felkner, 652
[Vol. 50
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The homemaker in a second marriage who does not have marketable
skills also can be protected even though that second marriage is relatively
short. In Kerns v. Kerns,"5 the marriage had lasted only six years but a $200
a month maintenance award was affirmed. The appellate court noted that the
fifty-five year old wife had been employed as a real estate salesperson prior to
the marriage but the husband had preferred to "have her as a housewife."116
During the marriage, she assisted him in his business and worked in the real
estate business only occasionally. In Ort v. Ort,1 7 an award of $500 a month
maintenance was affirmed where the second marriage lasted only eight years
but the fifty-five year old wife had not been employed "for several years." The
court described her as "physically disabled, marginally educated and margin-
ally trained."'1 8 Neither of these opinions stated a rationale for the affirmance.
Both suggest the possibility that the second marriage eliminated alimony from
the first marriage which would not be reinstated. 19 Kern indicates strongly
that the wife may have become self-supporting after the first marriage but
damaged her earning capacity at the second husband's request. It is possible
that Mrs. Ort also relinquished whatever minimal employment she had to
maintain the second home. Together they paint a picture of a second "job" as
homemaker at an age when both husband and wife should realize that the last
chance for maintaining or developing earning capacity is being sacrificed for
the marriage. Therefore, maintenance appears especially appropriate for the
second spouse even in a relatively short marriage, if she does not have suffi-
cient marketable skills. 120
v. Employment appropriate to status and interests
The Comments to Section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
from which the Missouri maintenance section is taken state that employment
S.W.2d 174 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (19 year marriage; court states that the longer the
marriage the less likely the homemaker spouse will be able to acquire skills through
training); Niehaus v. Niehaus, 593 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Madden v.
Madden, 585 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (54-year-old wife after 35 years in
the home employed as a part-time bank teller at $2.81 an hour); LoPiccolo v. LoPic-
colo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (38-year-old wife after 16 years in the
home earned $4.00 during her first nine hour day selling women's clothing); cf. In re
Marriage of K.B., 648 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (44-year-old wife trained as
dental hygienist but 20 years in the home sacrificed development of career).
115. 552 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
116. Id. at 351.
117. 652 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
118. Id. at 185.
119. Glass v. Glass, 546 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
120. Contrast second marriages in which the wife has not sacrificed her employ-
ment opportunities. For cases affirming denial of maintenance, see Slenker v. Slenker,
673 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984); Satterfield v. Satterfield, 635 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1982); In re Marriage of Hartzell, 634 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
1985] 279
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should be "appropriate to his or her skills and interests."' 1 The Comment
from the Uniform Law has been quoted favorably by Missouri courts a num-
ber of times.122 In one of the earliest decisions under the 1974 Act, the hus-
band, who could well afford to fully support the wife, argued that unless she
was expected to obtain employment to contribute to her support, the language
"appropriate employment" would apply only to the poor. 23 The court re-
sponded by quoting from pre-Act cases to the effect that the wife should be
maintained in the station of life and style to which the husband's social stand-
ing and pecuniary faculties entitle her. Other factors in the case were a physi-
cal disability, age, and custody of a thirteen-year-old. However, the case
strongly suggests that after a long marriage at an upper class standard of
living, in which wives devote their time to assisting their husband's careers
directly through entertaining and indirectly by their membership in country
clubs and good works in civic and charitable causes, it would not be appropri-
ate to expect that homemaker to obtain employment as a clerk in the discount
store or, perhaps, even as a receptionist or secretary. The numerous cases in
which substantial monthly maintenance has been approved or increased rein-
forces the conclusion that social status is relevant in determining interests
which affect what type employment is appropriate.124
The courts have held that "appropriate employment" does not require a
wife "to accept a job unsuited to her interests and talents for no other reason
than its availability, when more suitable jobs are in reasonable prospect."' 5 In
Scott v. Scott,"26 the husband complained that the wife had refused to pursue
a job selling insurance or trust services. The wife, who was thirty-one years old
with a master's degree in elementary guidance and who had taught psychology
on a college level, explained that it was not the kind of job she was prepared
for and that she was seeking employment in her field. The court affirmed $400
a month maintenance for four years. The award would enable her to look
longer for employment which would be closer to her skills and interests. In the
long run, this probably would be more remunerative and socially valuable than
something for which she was not prepared. A similar concept was expressed
earlier by a court which said that the policy of the law was neither to provide
a lifetime annuity nor to reduce the wife "to menial labor to eke out an
121. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 494 (1973).
122. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 494 (1973), quoted in
Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977), and
Spicer v. Spicer, 585 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979). Employment "corre-
sponding" to skills and interests was used in In re Marriage of Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d
292 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
123. Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
124. See cases cited at The Standard for Need, supra. However, even these
awards seldom exceed $2,000 a month. Without other income, that is not enough to
support a high standard of living.
125. Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Faulkner v.
Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
126. 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
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vi. Custodian of a child
Section 452.335.1 provides that maintenance may be granted only when
the person seeking either (1) lacks sufficient property and (2) is unable to
support himself "or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circum-
stances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employ-
ment outside the home." The language and structure are unambiguous in al-
lowing maintenance to one who otherwise could contribute to her own support
or fully supply that support but for the fact that she is remaining home to care
for a child. The Preliminary Analysis for the Commissioners on Uniform Laws
had expressed the goal of enabling custodians of children to remain at home
through maintenance and child support if property division were insufficient.1 28
The language leaves extremely broad discretion in the court to determine
when a person otherwise capable of employment will be excused because of
child custody. There are no guidelines for interpreting "condition or circum-
stances" which "make it appropriate" that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home. The courts have enunciated little that is
helpful, perhaps because the custodian seldom attempts to use custody as a
reason for not becoming employed. The only appellate court statement which
seems to discount entirely the fact of custodianship of pre-school children is
dicta because the court had held previously that the evidence established that
the wife's needs were met fully.129
As may be expected, when the child is pre-school age the courts are more
likely to find that seeking outside employment is inappropriate. Awards of
maintenance were affirmed utilizing this factor in In re Marriage of Vanet130
and Butler v. Butler.131 The Vanet court, after stating the trial court's implicit
finding that it was inappropriate for the wife to seek employment, explained
that the wife's alleged earning capacity was an illusory financial resource and
entitled to little or no weight in determining maintenance.1 32 The most ex-
treme opinion utilizing this portion of the statute is P.A.A. v. S.T.A.,3 3 in
which the appellate court reversed a denial of maintenance to a mother of two
children aged five and two at the time of trial. The appellate court said, "Her
place is in the home with the children," and cited Vanet concerning the illu-
sory nature of her alleged earning capacity.134 Ironically, in none of these
cases was the amount of maintenance and child support sufficient to support
127. In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Mo. App., E.D. 1977).
128. R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMI-
NARY ANALYSIS 147 (1968).
129. Cissell v. Cissell, 573 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
130. 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
131. 562 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
132. In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
133. 592 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
134. Id. at 504.
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fully the custodian at a standard of living comparable to that during the mar-
riage. A husband usually cannot support fully the children and the custodial
parent. Marriage dissolution forces nearly all able-bodied former homemakers,
including custodians of small children, into the work place even with the help
of maintenance.
In cases involving elementary and junior high age children, the appellate
courts ordinarily defer to the trial courts.135 When the trial court has granted
maintenance, it is affirmed with a statement to the effect that it was proper to
consider custodianship of children in making the award. 386 In Sarandos v.
Sarandos,1 3 7 the court approved maintenance for a mother who had been
home full time to raise two older sons and wished to give the thirteen-year-old
son the same nurture and caring. The court quoted from an earlier decision" 8"
to the effect that, given her limited employment experience, it was not unrea-
sonable to place the welfare of the son above the possible financial burden on
the boy's father to provide maintenance. On the contrary, a number of appel-
late courts have stated the consideration as a double negative: if custody does
not require staying at home, then maintenance may be awarded only if the
custodian is not able to support herself through employment. 39 Using the
words "custody does not require" indicates the extreme deference that is given
to the trial court's decision that it is appropriate to seek employment.
The issue of appropriateness of the custodial parent becoming employed
seldom is discussed when the children are high school age or older. In two
cases the courts upheld an award of maintenance stairstepped to terminate
after the teenagers would reach age twenty-one. This indirectly recognized
that the custody of children affected the amount of maintenance awarded.140
vii. Physical and mental health
Ill health or physical disability which adversely affects the ability to sup-
135. E.g., In re Marriage of Carmack, 550 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
136. Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (13-year-old
child); Goff v. Goff, 557 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (three children, two under
10); Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) (13-year-old
child).
137. 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
138. In re Marriage of Prenavo, 556 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
139. Lewis v. Lewis, 637 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (affirming $400 a
month maintenance); Metts v. Metts, 625 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981) (chil-
dren 12 and 16, affirmed denial of maintenance); J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889
(Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Abney v. Abney, 575 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
140. Hebron v. Hebron, 566 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (five children
all minors, youngest 13 at time of award); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1976) (two teenage girls). A later eastern district decision held that mere expected
emancipation is not a sufficient basis for limiting the duration of maintenance. Blount
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port oneself"41 is recognized consistently as a relevant factor in awarding
maintenance.242 When added to advanced age, long marriage, and no marketa-
ble skills, the case for maintenance is unimpeachable. Occasionally, disability
forms the basis for reversing a denial of maintenance.1 4 The health considera-
tion is relevant when the condition is mental or emotional as well as physi-
cal."4 The high percentage of appealed cases in which health is an issue sug-
gests that attorneys on both sides always should investigate possible evidence
on this factor. However, once the record shows health problems that do lessen
the ability to earn, appeal to challenge an award probably is futile except on
grounds of inability to pay.
B. Factors to Reduce Amount
1. Ability of Obligor to Pay
a. Statutory Factor Applied
By meeting the need requirements of section 452.335.1, the party seeking
maintenance has established eligibility or a right to maintenance.1 45 Conse-
quently, the factor enumerated in section 452.335.2 (6)---"The ability of the
spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting
those of the spouse seeking maintenance"--should affect only the amount or
duration of maintenance and in itself should not preclude an award of mainte-
nance. This explains some decisions that have affirmed awards of nominal
maintenance when there exist both need of the requesting party and inability
to pay on the part of the potential obligor. 46
141. Abney v. Abney, 575 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (remanded for
evidence on effect of disability).
142. Diehl v. Diehl, 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); Jones v. Jones, 658
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Ort v. Ort, 652 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App., E.D.
1983); Schreier v. Schreier, 625 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); In re Marriage of
Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Cody, 572 S.W.2d
635 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); McBane v. McBane, 553 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App., K.C.
1977); Hulsey v. Hulsey, 550 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); In re Marriage of
Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., E.D. 1977); Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249
(Mo. App., K.C. 1976); In re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App., St. L.
1976)
143. McLay v. McLay, 597 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 555 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
144. Moseley v. Moseley, 642 S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); Niehaus v.
Niehaus, 593 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Smith v. Smith, 586 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Kerns v. Kerns, 552 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
145. Brown v. Brown, 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984); see also Hor-
ridge v. Horridge, 618 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (if neither property nor
employment are sufficient to meet reasonable needs, the court must set the amounts
and time of maintenance).
146. Bell v. Bell, 641 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Phelps v. Phelps, 620
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Once again the trial judge is vested with wide discretion. Trial court deci-
sions to grant maintenance are affirmed almost routinely. Courts have said
that an award would be reversed only if it were patently unwarranted or
wholly beyond the ability of the obligor to pay.147 However, this does not mean
that awards are upheld without any review at all. Appellate courts have stated
that the award should not exceed the obligor's capacity to provide14 8 and that
the duty is only to pay insofar as the obligor is able.1 49 One court upheld an
award after noting that the husband would incur "no sacrifice" of expendi-
tures for his own needs.150 The most likely fact is that trial courts are consid-
ering seriously the obligor's ability to pay when setting the initial award.151
The large number of awards that are modest in amount, varying from $50 to
$500 a month and less than the full needs of the spouse requesting mainte-
nance, indicates that both parties' attorneys and the trial judge usually weigh
this factor heavily.1 52 In one case in which the issue of need for maintenance
had been litigated intensely and was held established, the appellate court, nev-
ertheless, remanded for findings on the obligor's ability to pay.1 53
The Missouri courts articulate as a guide to applying this factor that they
are considering the relative economic condition of the parties1 5 ' or that they
are striking a balance between the husband's ability to pay and the wife's
147. In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); In re
Marriage of Schafer, 609 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
148. Brown v. Brown, 537 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
149. Phelps v. Phelps, 620 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
150. Niehaus v. Niehaus, 593 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
151. Apparently, only one case has reversed an award of maintenance for insuffi-
ciently considering the ability of the obligor to meet his own needs. See Alvino v. Al-
vino, 659 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983). When the marriage is short, denial of
maintenance from a husband with a modest income is likely to be affirmed. In re Mar-
riage of Kennedy, 673 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984).
152. The most comprehensive empirical research on dissolution economics was
conducted in California and concluded that women were far worse off economically
after divorce than men largely because men paid little in support, allowing them to
maintain their previous or a higher standard of living. Weitzman, The Economics of
Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181 (1981). The study discovered that women and chil-
dren bear the brunt of reduced standard of living due to one household becoming two.
It criticized that result because of the negative effect on children. This economic Post-
divorce phenomenon is stated often as the feminization of poverty or the impoverish-
ment of women. The practical means by which this result could occur is that the rea-
sonable needs of the women are set too low and that even those needs are not met by
support awards if attorneys and judges believe the obligation on the obligors will inter-
fere with meeting the obligors' own needs to maintain a comfortable lifestyle close to
that experienced during the marriage. In other words, if there is not sufficient money
for both to maintain the earlier standard of living, the person seeking suffers. Since
women, generally, earn less than men, they and the children in their custody suffer
most.
153. Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
154. N.J.W. v. W.E.W., 584 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
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reasonable needs. 55 Even in cases where the ability to pay is obvious, the
court is likely to mention that it is a factor appropriately considered. 16 In
another group of cases, the appellate courts have referred explicitly to the ex-
treme disparity in income or expenses between the husband and wife as
though that were relevant in weighing the ability of the obligor to meet his
needs while meeting those of the requesting party. 157 Disparity may well be an
influence in a few cases where both incomes and expenses were modest, and
the courts have affirmed awards even when they were likely to restrict the
prior living standard of the obligor.' 58
Both the award and the denial of maintenance have been affirmed when
the parties' very modest incomes were not sufficient to meet both persons'
needs and the trial court's action has equalized their positions. In Brueg-
gemann v. Brueggemann,'59 maintenance was denied even though the wife had
claimed an income of $5,600 and expenses of $10,300 contrasted with hus-
band's claimed income of $10,300 and expenses of $8,600. The court added to
wife's income $150 in child support and subtracted from her expenses $114 in
mortgage payments which the husband was ordered to pay monthly. When
those amounts are added to the husband's expenses, a remarkably equal pic-
ture emerges. Wife's income was $7,400 and her expenses were $8,932 for a
shortage of $1,532. Husband's income was $10,300 and his expenses were
$11,768 for a shortage of $1,468. The result was that they shared equally in
155. Bull v. Bull, 634 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); In re Marriage of
Zuniga, 622 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Myers v. Myers, 586 S.W.2d 797
(Mo. App., W.D. 1979); Sawtell v. Sawtell, 569 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
156. Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); cf. Hoff-
man v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (noting approvingly mainte-
nance over $4,000 a month); Geil v. Geil, 647 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983)
(rev'd denial of maintenance); Cregan v. Clark, 658 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., W.D.
1983); Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (affirmed main-
tenance 10% in excess of proved needs); In re Marriage of Pine, 625 S.W.2d 942 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1981).
157. Diehl v. Diehl, 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984) (noting that hus-
band's stated expenses were double the award to wife); Childers v. Childers, 652
S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (noting husband's income seven times that of wife
whose expenses exceeded her income by $1,300); J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889
(Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (husband earning $17,000 and wife $6,800; court suggested
both may have to adjust budgets downward); LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501
(Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (noting wife's expenses $7,200 and husband's income between
$60,000 and $75,000).
158. In In re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976), after
a 27 year marriage the wife, who had no skills, earned $138 a month and the husband
$830. The appellate court affirmed orders to pay $200 child support and another $200
maintenance. In Viers v. Viers, 600 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), the husband,
who had custody and earned only $900 a month, was ordered to pay $50 a month to
the wife, who earned $500 a month as a janitor. In Dickerson v. Dickerson, 576
S.W.2d 567 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979), a husband, who earned $1,100 a month, was or-
dered to pay $100 to a wife, who earned $640 a month.
159. 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
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their shortfall. 6 0 Similar outcomes have been achieved by awarding mainte-
nance. 16 1 In Murray v. Murray,162 the court affirmed an award of $50 a week
maintenance against an argument that the trial court had not considered the
husband's ability to pay. The court footnoted the sad results for parties of
limited means: the husband had $61 a week and the wife had $62 a week for
themselves.
Perhaps long-term marriages with pitifully little in property or income
should continue regardless of personal compatibility. Economic interest may
call for the parties to continue to share the effects of the joint earning capacity
developed during their lives. The cases discussed here were decided relatively
soon after adoption of the 1974 law. Such extreme situations seldom appear in
the appellate records now. Attorneys, acting in their role as counselors at the
stage when one of the parties is considering marriage dissolution, may be ad-
vising them that due to the fact that the parties are never likely to be able to
meet their needs in separate households, they should consider continuing the
marriage and one household.1 63
However, obligors' hopes of freedom from the obligations of marriage
may rise after learning of a 1983 decision which appears to be the first rever-
sal of an award of maintenance for failure to consider adequately the obligor's
ability to meet his needs while contributing to the other. In Alvino v. Al-
vino,16' the marriage had lasted thirty-five years and produced eleven children,
two of whom were in the custody of the wife. The husband earned $1,123
160. Unfortunately, the reference to the Brueggemann case in the Missouri Bar
Family Law CLE at page 12-18 (3rd ed. 1982), is extremely misleading. It sets out
only the figures indicating that the husband had much more income than the wife,
thereby erroneously suggesting that the court allowed such a disparity to exist without
an obligation to pay maintenance.
161. In Murphy v. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976), the hus-
band with an income of $800 a month reported expenses of only $350. Wife earned $60
a week and asserted expenses of $650 for herself and three children. Husband was
ordered to pay $100 a month for each of three children and $150 a month mainte-
nance. The effect was that each received his stated needs plus $40 or $50 even though
husband was paying more than half his income in support.
162. 538 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
163. In Jones v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983), a marriage of
over 50 years, the appellate court noted that on one version of the evidence there was a
$202 difference in their incomes after a 50/50 division of property and $175 mainte-
nance monthly. But that disparity would occur only if the 77-year-old man continued
to work as a school crossing guard. The court held that even on the latter assumption,
there was no abuse of discretion in not ordering greater maintenance. The case shows
that, even in a modest income situation, disparity will not be eliminated always. But
Jones is intriguing primarily because the parties had agreed to remain in the family
home, sharing equally income from rented portions. One wonders why they wanted the
marriage dissolved or why the attorneys could not devise a satisfactory alternative ar-
rangement to a contested and appealed case. However, assuming the parties insisted on
dissolution, the house sharing appears a creative solution to the economic situation. See
also R. NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION (1984).
164. 659 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
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monthly from regular employment and an unstated amount from part-time
work. The trial court ordered $400 child support and $500 maintenance
monthly. That would be $300 each for the wife and two children, leaving only
$273 for the husband, if nothing from the part-time work were considered.
This was reversed as an abuse of discretion with the flat statement that it was
insufficient to meet his needs.
b. Earning Ability vs. Temporary Condition
A temporary slump in income will not affect the amount of maintenance
the obligor may be ordered to pay. Rather, the courts have stated repeatedly
that both prior and anticipated earning capacity of the obligor are the relevant
factors.165 A reduction in income will not serve alone as a basis for reduction
of family support payments. 6 This is well illustrated by Steffan v. Steffan,117
where the husband had switched from insurance to real estate sales within a
year of the dissolution trial. The Steffan court said, "Whether the husband's
future earning capacity consistently slumps to an extent which might prompt
and support modification of the present maintenance award awaits another
time and occasion."168 In In re Marriage of Vanet,x' 9 the husband had left an
established law firm eleven months prior to the dissolution trial in order to
"launch out" on his own. The Vanet court commented that the members of the
court are not "blind to the fact that a lawyer's income is subject to fluctuation,
and, if for no other reason, a lawyer's capacity to pay maintenance and child
support, if realistically assessed, properly entails consideration of both his past
and anticipated earning capacity." 1
The husband who quits or limits his work as a regular matter' 1 or in
connection with the marital troubles or the dissolution proceedings 72 receives
no sympathy from the appellate courts. They hold that a person may not de-
165. Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Bull v. Bull, 634
S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Broyles v. Broyles, 555 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1977); Brown v. Brown, 537 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Naeger v.
Naeger, 542 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Murray v. Murray, 538 S.W.2d 587
(Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Richardson v. Richardson, 524 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App., St. L.
1975).
166. Seelig v. Seelig, 540 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Foster v. Foster,
537 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
167. 597 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
168. Id. at 883.
169. 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
170. Id. at 242.
171. In re Marriage of Cody, 572 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (little
evidence of husband's income because he hangs around pool rooms, plays a bit of pool,
and borrows money from mother and girlfriends rather than having regular
employment).
172. Jackson v. Jackson, 655 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (upon separa-
tion husband quit previously lucrative employment); Morovitz v. Morovitz, 633 S.W.2d
211 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (husband quit job when wife filed for dissolution).
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cline voluntarily to work and plead lack of income as a basis for shirking re-
sponsibilities to the family.17 3 In Klinge v. Klinge,14 after a marriage of
twenty-eight years, the husband, who was a physician-surgeon with an income
in the upper $70,000-per-year bracket, lost his hospital surgical privileges and
began work on a twenty hour a week basis with a clinic at a full-time rate of
$35,000 annually. He refused full-time work, saying that he wanted to devote
time to his own office practice. That choice was denied him by the court as he
could not do so and meet the fairly modest maintenance awards entered. The
court affirmed $500 a month child support (for two children) and $400 a
month maintenance, saying that the husband may not escape his responsibility
to his family or stymie justified support for them by deliberately limiting his
work to reduce his income. Similar is Bull v. Bull, 75 where the court affirmed
a $2,000 per month maintenance award noting the husband controlled his sal-
ary through control of a highly successful close corporation and his previous
salary was ample to pay that amount.
c. Property Affecting Ability to Pay
Just as property is relevant to determine the ability of the person seeking
maintenance to supply his or her own needs, it is also relevant in determining
ability to pay maintenance. In Horridge v. Horridge,"6 the court said both
separate property and the marital property awarded to the obligor could illus-
trate ability to pay. In Diehl v. Diehl,'" the court in affirming maintenance
noted that non-essential assets such as a camper and boat had been awarded
to the obligor, thus implying that he could sell them. In Scott v. Scott, 78 the
court affirmed a $12,000 lump sum award saying that the obligor had un-
touched separate property that could be utilized to pay the award. Of course,
some types of property would not have to be sold but could be used as security
for a loan to pay a lump sum award.
2. Conduct During Marriage
a. Relevance of Conduct
Section 452.335.2(7), "Conduct of a party seeking maintenance during
the marriage," is a factor to be considered, not in determining the right or
173. In re Marriage of Cody, 572 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (citing
Boyer v. Boyer, 567 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978)); Butler v. Butler, 562 S.W.2d
685 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977). This is the traditional law of Missouri. See, e.g., Weiss v.
Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965).
174. 554 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
175. 634 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
176. 618 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
177. 670 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
178. 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
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eligibility for maintenance, but rather in setting the amount and duration.1
In Brown v. Brown, 80 the wife had cohabited with another man during the
twenty-seven months of a six year marriage that immediately preceeded the
decree. Although the appellate court reversed the entire award of in gross
maintenance for lack of evidence to support it, the court held that the cohabi-
tation during the marriage alone could not preclude maintenance, but was
only relevant on the issue of duration and amount.
b. Type and Time of Conduct
Personal conduct during the marriage, in addition to that affecting prop-
erty or money, is relevant.' 8 ' Good conduct, especially rising to the level of
sacrifice by one spouse for the benefit of the other, is relevant. In a case where
the wife had loaned money to the husband and also had borrowed money for
his benefit for which she was obligated after the marriage, it was proper to
consider that good conduct relevant. 8 2 Misconduct or bad conduct apparently
is relevant only when a degree of fault or willfulness has contributed to it. A
denial of maintenance because of conduct was reversed where the cause was
emotional illness. 8 3 The emotional disturbance was attributed to childbirth
and becoming attached to a psychiatrist during psychiatric therapy in what
was described as a common transference phenomenon. Additionally, the con-
duct may have to precede the dissolution closely enough that it could not be
considered condoned. In one case, the court affirmed $1,500 a month mainte-
nance to a forty-four-year-old wife even though she had experienced drug and
alcohol problems. The court noted that she had not had those problems for
four years preceding the filing for dissolution.'"
c. Degree of Relevant Conduct
From the beginning of litigation under the statute the courts have been
reluctant to encourage counter charges and extensive airing in court of bitter
accusations concerning trivialities. In Brueggemann v. Brueggemann,8 5 the
court refused to recount the testimony consisting of charges and counter-
charges of misconduct. Other opinions have acknowledged the alleged miscon-
duct, but affirmed awards of maintenance saying simply that neither party had
been exemplary 8 6 or that the conduct was not sufficient to deny mainte-
179. Brown v. Brown, 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984); In re Marriage
of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Carmack, 550
S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
180. 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
181. Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
182. D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
183. P.A.A. v. S.T.A., 592 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
184. C.B.H. v. R.N.H., 571 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
185. 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
186. J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
1985] 289
31
Krauskopf: Krauskopf:  Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
nance. 117 The courts consider relevant only serious misconduct, and then only
when one party is significantly more at fault than the other. In affirming main-
tenance, the court in Fausett v. Fausett'88 stated the requirement as conduct
by the errant spouse which placed "extra burdens on the non-errant
spouse."''8 9
There are only a few appellate reports in which it is clear that the mis-
conduct was sufficient to affect seriously the amount of maintenance. In
Schnitker v. Schnitker,90 the court affirmed denial of maintenance to a forty-
two-year-old woman who had not been employed during most of a twenty year
marriage, noting that she had $30,000 in cash, the husband who had custody
of the children had expenses exceeding his income, and the "breakup of the
parties came when the wife took up with another man."191 Even more extreme
action by the appellate court was its reversal of an in gross maintenance award
in Brown v. Brown'92 saying that the wife's cohabitation with another man for
twenty-seven months during the marriage was relevant. In Rasmussen v. Ras-
mussen, 93 the main factor justifying a durational limit on maintenance was
misconduct of the intensely jealous wife in harassing the husband by threaten-
ing his life, asking him to leave the marital home, physically attacking him,
making threatening phone calls to women she believed were involved with him,
publicly confronting and humiliating him with threats, and trying to have him
fired from his employment.
d. Conduct of the Obligor Spouse
Since Brueggemann v. Brueggemann,194 it has been recognized that the
legislature, by allowing maintenance to both parties and eliminating fault con-
siderations other than the conduct of the party seeking maintenance, evinced a
"legislative intent to remove any punitive quality as to the party providing
maintenance."'' 95 The legislature insisted upon inserting conduct into the bill
which originally was drafted as worded in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act precluding conduct considerations. Members of the legislature were con-
cerned that vengeance might be asserted against an adulteress who obtained
maintenance. However, when reminded that imprisonment for contempt in re-
187. In re Marriage of Carmack, 550 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
188. 661 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
189. Id. at 619.
190. 646 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
191. Id. at 124-26; see also J.H.M. v. E.C.M., 544 S.W.2d 582, 586-87 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1976) (affirming denial of maintenance to 40-year-old unemployed wife
who had slept with another man while children were in the house and aware of her
conduct).
192. 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
193. 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
194. 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
195. Id. at 856. Comments about the legislature in this paragraph are based on
author Krauskopf's personal knowledge.
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fusing to pay would not be available to enforce an order intended to punish for
fault, the legislature limited the conduct consideration in the maintenance sec-
tion to that of the person seeking maintenance. Decisions which preclude con-
sidering the obligor spouse's misconduct in setting maintenance are consistent
with that legislative history. Consequently, one should view with suspicion
statements that approve higher awards of maintenance in recognition of the
obligor's misconduct. 196
To be distinguished are situations where it is appropriate to consider the
obligor's misconduct as it affects other issues. For example, unjustified refusal
to reimburse for benefits received by the obligor may be a basis for restitution
to the requesting spouse.197 Also to be distinguished are situations where evi-
dence is sparse concerning ability to pay because of the obligor's lack of can-
dor in regard to his financial condition.198 An important means of utilizing
obligor misconduct is to demonstrate its effect on the obligor's ability to pay.
For example, money spent on a paramour and her children is not a legitimate
expense to reduce the obligor's ability to support the spouse and their own
children. 99
3. Other Relevant Factors: Cohabitation
Since section 452.335.2 states that any relevant factor may be considered
by the court in determining amount and duration of maintenance, neither the
requirements of subsection 1 nor the seven listed factors in subsection 2 are
exclusive. Any fact which logically affects the need of a requesting spouse
should be relevant. In Brown v. Brown,200 the court held that neither cohabita-
tion with another man during nor after the marriage affected the property or
employment considerations of subsection 1. The court held that since there
was no right to be supported by the cohabiting partner, the requesting spouse
had no property interest in an expectation of support. The court also held that
cohabitation following the dissolution did not affect the ability of the request-
ing spouse to be self-supporting through appropriate employment. However,
the cohabitation could be considered within the "other relevant factor" clause
of subsection 2 because the wife had testified that her cohabitant had been
supporting her and that they planned to be married. The court held that was
information highly relevant to her present and future economic needs. The
Brown court discussed cases in other jurisdictions dealing with the effect of
later cohabitation on alimony awards and agreed with the majority rule that
cohabitation does not preclude maintenance automatically but is a relevant
economic factor affecting the need for maintenance. The court reversed an
$8,000 in gross award for lack of supporting evidence, listing as contrary evi-
196. Abanathy v. Abanathy, 657 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
197. See Reasonable Needs, supra, Specific or Temporary Needs.
198. Bequette v. Bequette, 563 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
199. In re Marriage of Runez, 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983).
200. 673 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
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dence: cohabitation, only a six year marriage, no children, and division of
property.
C. Prototype Fact Combinations: Abuse of Discretion in Denial, Award,
or Amount
The petitioner's primary hurdle is establishing reasonable needs and the
inability to meet them by property or earnings. Awards of maintenance seldom
are reversed. Among only eight reversals found in the first decade under the
1974 law, all but one was based on lack of evidence of need for the award. 20 1
Assuming evidence in the record shows that the petitioner for maintenance
does not have adequate income or property to cover expenses, the factors of
subsection 2 become applicable. First, the court will determine the reasonable
needs by considering the duration of the marriage and standard of living of the
parties and the earning ability of the petitioner. 02 Second, the court will con-
sider those same factors plus others, including the ability of the obligor to pay
and conduct of the petitioner, to determine the amount and duration of main-
tenance. The various factors are balanced and weighed in a form of factor
analysis that varies with the infinite variety of facts that exist in dissolution
cases. However, study of decisions using the subsection 2 factors, after reason-
able need has been established, reveals a distinct pattern of prototype combi-
nations that illustrate when it is appropriate and inappropriate to deny mainte-
nance, award small amounts of maintenance, or award significant amounts of
periodic maintenance to a petitioner who has established reasonable needs.
1. Long-term Traditional Homemaker
When the- petitioner has been a homemaker in a marriage of about
twenty years or more, is approximately forty-five years old or older, and has
not been employed during most of the marriage, awards of any amount are
affirmed routinely. This is true even when the obligor will have to adjust his
standard of living downward to a relatively equal level with that of the recipi-
ent in order to make the payments.20 3 In the ten years between the effective
date of the Act and 1984, there appears to be only one successful appeal by an
obligor of an award of maintenance in the long-term traditional homemaker
situation where need was established. In Alvino v. Alvino, the award was re-
201. See discussion and notes, supra, The Standard for Need.
202. See discussion, supra, Establishing Reasonable Needs, and Inability to Pro-
vide for Self.
203. See cases discussed, supra, Inability to Provide for Self, and Ability of Ob-
ligor to Pay. In the latter section, the denial of maintenance which was affirmed in
Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977), is explained
as due to the equalization of the ex-spouses' economic situations after the husband paid
child support and mortgage payments on the wife's home. The indication in the Mis-
souri Bar Family Law CLE that the husband had nearly twice her spendable income is
not accurate, supra note 160.
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versed based on the inability of the obligor to pay the award while meeting his
own needs.20 4 Otherwise, awards of maintenance have not been reversed.
Maintenance is compelled when the long-term homemaker prototype is
enhanced by two additional facts. The fact of a high standard of living during
the marriage and the fact of undoubted ability of the obligor to pay without
sacrificing his own lifestyle have supported numerous substantial maintenance
awards.20 1 When the standard of living is high and ability to pay clear, appel-
late courts have reversed moderate amounts of maintenance as too low and
have entered modifications to increase the amount of the award.206 No denial
of maintenance to a long-term homemaker has been affirmed when need and
ability to pay have been shown.
The continued insistence on awarding maintenance to the long-term tradi-
tional homemaker is consistent with the rationale for maintenance as a remedy
for reliance upon lifelong support from the income producer, particularly
where such reliance caused a severe and irremediable reduction or elimination
of earning capacity in the homemaker.20 7 The first total departure at the trial
level from continued application of this remedy for the long-term homemaker
which appeared in the appellate records was Geil v. Geil,208 decided in 1983.
The trial court's denial of maintenance was reversed and an award of $400 a
month entered. The reversal suggests continued vigilance of the appellate
courts to carry out the legislative intent to provide a remedy for the person
who had relied economically on the other spouse.20 9
204. 659 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983). See discussion, supra, Ability of
Obligor to Pay. It should be noted that the appellate court did not consider any amount
earned from his part-time work because there was no evidence of what that amount
was. On the evidence, he was left with less for himself than each of the children and
wife who were living together and presumably did not need as much per capita.
205. Childers v. Childers, 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., 8.D. 1983) ($1,300 a
month affirmed); Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982)
($1,500 a month affirmed as appropriate amount, but remanded to determine obligor's
ability to pay); cf. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (main-
tenance exceeded $4,000 per month). See discussion, supra, Establishing Reasonable
Needs, Standard of Living and Duration.
206. Cregan v. Clark, 658 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983) (20 year mar-
riage, wife 41 years old, husband earned $85,000 which exceeded his stated expenses
by $2,000 a month; increased $500 a month to $1.000 a month); In re Marriage of
Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979) ($1,500 a month raised to $1,900 a
month).
207. See discussion, supra, Introduction.
208. 647 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
209. Two decisions should be distinguished carefully. In Metts v. Metts, 625
S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981), the same judge who wrote the Geil opinion revers-
ing a denial of maintenance, authored an opinion affirming a denial to a wife of 22
years. The explanation for Metts is that the wife defaulted and the husband introduced
evidence that she was employable and had one million dollars in property. In Colabi-
anchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed a modest award of $360 a month because the wife had established a
need for only $724 a month and testified that she earned $430 a month. Both cases are
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However, the inadequacy of the amount ordered in Geil suggests a possi-
ble lessening of appellate protection for the long-term homemaker in the East-
ern District. The court in Geil did not mention numerous earlier decisions that
articulate equalization of economic status of the parties and closing the gap
between resources and needs as goals of maintenance, especially in the long-
term homemaker situation. The recipient was a classic example of that proto-
type. She was forty-seven years old, had been unemployed during a twenty-five
year marriage in which the husband had discouraged her from employment,
had a minor child in her custody, had no income-producing property, and was
taking typing and data processing courses but had tried unsuccessfully for a
period of time to obtain employment. There was no evidence of misconduct on
her part. The husband earned $39,000 and his current expenses were due par-
tially to supporting a woman and her children with whom he was living. The
wife's income and expense statement listed no income and $1,500 monthly
expenses. She testified that she needed $800 a month maintenance. The $400
amount is shockingly inadequate. The court said it protected the long-term
homemaker by granting maintenance as legislatively authorized but it
awarded such a trifling sum that the only purpose of maintenance served was
protection of the welfare rolls.21 0 The effect resembles a magic show with a
tragic twist. Homemakers are encouraged to remain home full-time to raise
children and care for the family with the assurance that if they are displaced,
maintenance will reimburse them; but when the time comes, the maintenance
they expected magically disappears. When the Geil fact combination is com-
pared to the past pattern of decisions and articulated guidelines, none of the
previously recognized reasons for granting less than need were present.21' If
the decision presages a trend, it means the disappearance of meaningful main-
tenance. Since most, and perhaps all, of the appellate decisions increasing the
amount of maintenance awarded have been from the Western District,21 2 a
simply failures of the wife to evidence adequately her needs.
210. A Florida court recently reversed an award of $800 a month for a long-term
homemaker whose husband earned $60,000 annually saying it was "a paltry" amount
not in keeping with the needs of the recipient. Orr v. Orr, 458 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1984).
211. A possibly more unwarranted decision in 1984 suggests a disregard for the
remedial purposes of maintenance. In Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 669 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1984), the court upheld a time limit on maintenance saying that mainte-
nance could have been denied entirely. The petitioner for maintenance was a healthy
40-year-old woman employed but earning significantly less than her needs. The opinion
did not give other essential facts: length of marriage; standard of living during mar-
riage; time out of employment while serving family; conduct of petitioner; obligor's
income; or obligor's expenses. Without those facts it is impossible to assess on a princi-
pled basis whether maintenance could have been denied without abuse of discretion.
This case is discussed, supra, Appropriate Employment, and, infra, Durational Limits.
212. Cregan v. Clark, 658 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983); In re Marriage
of Pituck, 616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); McLay v. McLay, 597 S.W.2d
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split between the districts may have become evident on the adequacy of the
amount of maintenance. 13
2. Short-term Marriage
The prototype fact combination most in contrast to the long-term tradi-
tional homemaker is the less than ten year marriage with the petitioner under
thirty-five years old, healthy and either continuously employed or not out of
the work force for very long. Ordinarily, maintenance is not ordered in this
situation. The courts often say, "Justice may not require a husband to assume
full support of a young healthy woman to whom he was married for only a
short period of time and who has not removed herself from employment for
any substantial period of time." '214
The dearth of these situations in the appellate records is surely because
maintenance is seldom an issue between the parties. These homemakers will
have lost far less in earning capacity due to the marriage than the long-term
homemaker, will have contributed less to the well-being of the other spouse,
and have a high probability of remarriage. 215 Consequently, the public policies
underlying maintenance do not apply as strongly. However, there are a num-
ber of identifiable additional facts that will justify and even require mainte-
nance at the conclusion of a short-term marriage.
i. Age or illness and lack of skill
The short-term prototype is not present when the marriage is relatively
short but the petitioner for maintenance is either older or ill and lacking in
marketable skills. As discussed earlier, even a short marriage of an economi-
cally dependent older spouse causes the same type of economic reliance engen-
dered in a long-term marriage.2 1 6 Because of the advanced age of the depen-
dent spouse, the loss of earning capacity is most likely permanent, or any
chance to develop an earning capacity will shortly become irretrievable. The
chances of remarriage and continuing to "earn a living" as a homemaker are
also drastically reduced. Additionally, the potential obligor who marries an
older, economically dependent person would know that this reliance is engen-
dered by the marriage. Although the courts have not articulated this reason-
213. For relevance of the long term traditional homemaker fact combination to
limiting the duration of awards, see discussion, infra, Durational Limits.
214. Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Raines v.
Raines, 583 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
215. Weitzman states that a woman under the age of 30 has a 75% chance of
remarriage. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181,
1228-29 (1981) (citing generally, NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT (Supp. Sept. 12, 1980)).
216. See discussion supra, Support Self Through Appropriate Employment,
Lack of Marketable Skills.
1985]
37
Krauskopf: Krauskopf:  Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ing, the fact pattern of decisions affirming maintenance suggests that it actu-
ally is operating, especially when the older spouse is unskilled or ill.2117 Similar
reasoning may be applicable when there is a physical condition that existed at
the inception of the marriage and which now prevents gainful employment. In
McLay v. McLay,21 8 the appellate court increased maintenance to a wife suf-
fering from progressive blindness existing at the time of marriage which pre-
vented her from obtaining work other than baby-sitting during a marriage of
twelve years. The situation has the same quality as the marriage to an older,
economically dependent spouse. The income-producing spouse surely expected
the wife to rely on his support and encouraged the reliance by marrying her
knowing of her condition. Thus, age or ill health coupled with lack of employ-
able skills justifiably change the short marriage prototype.21 9
ii. Maintenance for education or training
A major basis for justifying maintenance to the young, healthy, employ-
able spouse of a short-term marriage is so that she may obtain additional
training or education, thus enabling her to become more self-sufficient. 220 The
statutory factor requiring the court to consider the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employ-
ment evidences the legislative intent that it may be just to obligate the other
spouse for this purpose.
Two public policy justifications may be operating here. First, the mar-
riage, even though short, may have interfered with the requesting spouse's op-
portunity to develop earning capacity as fully as possible, warranting the
placement of some obligation on the other spouse to contribute to developing
that earning capacity. Second, in the long run it is socially beneficial for per-
sons to develop their earning capacity and productivity to the fullest and this is
one incentive to do so.
The earliest decision involving rehabilitative maintenance is Raines v.
Raines.221 The recipient spouse appealed claiming inadequacy of the award.
The approximately two year marriage of very young persons had lasted effec-
tively for only fifteen to eighteen months. The wife was receiving welfare bene-
fits. Although a child was born, the wife did not claim child care as reason for
not working. The marriage had not removed her from employment for any
217. See, e.g., Ort v. Ort, 652 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 555 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Kerns v. Kerns, 552 S.W.2d 350
(Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
218. 597 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
219. Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), does not
suggest any lessening of appellate protection to the ill spouse. The spouse who suffered
from multiple sclerosis did not appeal findings that her drinking prevented em-
ployability and that she could obtain work.
220. See discussion, supra, The Standard for Need, Specific or Temporary
Needs.
221. 583 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
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substantial time. Furthermore, the husband's significant employment began af-
ter their separation so that the court noted it could not be considered a "part-
nership asset" to which the wife had contributed. The wife had requested
maintenance so that she could attend college to study secretarial skills for six
years, but the trial court awarded $25.00 a week for two years. The appellate
court affirmed. It agreed with the trial court that two years should be sufficient
to obtain the type training she desired. More importantly, it affirmed only
$25.00 a week which was less than the husband could have afforded to pay
and far less than her need. The court emphasized that the fact of marriage
alone no longer gives rise to an obligation of full support as was the case under
the old statute. The court said, "Of particular consequence . . . is the third
statutory factor-length of the marriage. '222 The court's decision combines
disapproval of support obligations to meet full needs with approval of rehabili-
tative maintenance in the prototypical marriage.
The leading case on maintenance for education or training is Pederson v.
Pederson.2 23 The husband appealed an award for the purpose of attending
nursing school to a twenty-eight-year-old wife who had been employed
throughout the six year marriage. The decision is important for two reasons. It
is the first to affirm rehabilitative maintenance against the obligor's appeal.
Second, it reversed the unlimited time of the award and entered a time limit
corresponding with the expected time to complete schooling. The two parts of
the decision together tell us that in the prototypical situation where mainte-
nance would not otherwise be appropriate, it may be awarded for the specific
and limited purpose of rehabilitative education.
iii. Special equities
The appellate courts have reversed a number of denials of maintenance or
durational limits on maintenance in cases that fit the prototype of a short mar-
riage involving a young, healthy wife when there were added facts that made
it particularly equitable for the obligor to pay maintenance. The appellate
courts in these opinions do not say that a special equity exists, but analysis of
the combination of added facts reveals a striking similarity in their key fea-
tures. In P.A.A. v. S.T.A., 24 the thirty-two-year-old wife had worked while
the husband attended dental school, had worked in his dental office, and had
done unusual labor on a farm they purchased, had had two children aged five
and two at the time of the decree and had suffered emotionally after child-
birth. Although the appellate court articulated the mother's need to care for
the children as a reason for reversing a denial of maintenance, the fact pattern
also reveals extraordinary effort on the part of the wife most of which bene-
fited husband at the wife's expense. In Phelps v. Phelps, 2 5 the wife in a seven
222. Id. at 567.
223. 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
224. 592 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
225. 620 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
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year marriage was a Vietnamese brought to this country as a military bride.
For a long time while her husband was in the military, she had been unable to
obtain employment. When she finally obtained a minimum wage job doing
alterations, she was forced to quit because the husband insisted that she take a
vacation with him during a time that the employer forbade vacations. She had
not been able to complete the equivalency examinations for a high school de-
gree because of family responsibilities. The facts reveal that the wife's unusual
devotion to the husband and family was responsible for her economically vul-
nerable position.226 The legally blind wife in McLay227 surely was aided by the
equities when the court considered that she had suffered four miscarriages
partially due to husband's abuse and was working ninety hours a week baby-
sitting to earn only $24.00. Her progressive blindness, about which the hus-
band knew when he married her, the number of miscarriages, and her efforts
to earn something are all extraordinary tending to justify financial help from
the husband.
3. The Medium Length Marriage
The prototype medium length marriage of ten to twenty years involves a
petitioner for maintenance who is thirty-five to forty-five-years-old, who usu-
ally has custody of one or more teenaged children, whose chances of remar-
riage are only fifty to twenty-eight percent depending on her age,228 who is in
good health, and who has a job or can obtain one but whose earning capacity
has been lessened seriously by being out of the job market for ten to fifteen
years. 229 This is the most uncertain battleground of maintenance. This proto-
type differs from the long-term traditional homemaker whom almost everyone
agrees is not capable of self support. The homemaker in the medium length
marriage has more chance of obtaining some sort of employment and of devel-
oping some increase in earning capacity. This is the "displaced homemaker"
who has some chance of rehabilitation and adjustment to unmarried life. But
this prototype differs from the short-term marriage because the homemaker
has lost significantly more earning capacity due to family responsibilities and
there is less time to recoup it. In contrast to this prototype is the homemaker
spouse in a medium-length first or second marriage who continued her employ-
ment during the marriage. Although homemaking responsibilities, especially
maternity leaves, lessen earning capacity for this spouse, the decrease is not as
severe as for the full-time homemaker. A group of decisions affirming the de-
nial of maintenance are distinguishable from the prototype due to the fact of
226. See also discussions, supra, Specific or Temporary Needs.
227. See supra, notes 207-08.
228. Weitzman states that a woman aged between age 30 and 40 has a 50%
chance of remarriage, but if she is over 40 her chance of remarriage is only 28%.
Weitzman, supra, note 215 at 1229.
229. See discussion and studies cited supra, Introduction, Theory and Discretion.
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continued full-time employment during the marriage.130
However, the severity of the extended period of homemaking on lessened
earning capacity and retirement benefits of the medium-length homemaker
seldom is articulated by appellate courts. Most likely this information is not
presented either at trial or in appellate briefs.131 In view of the purpose of
maintenance, the underlying question should be, "Just what amount and dura-
tion of maintenance is justly required to remedy or compensate for the loss of
earning capacity due to foregone employment in the service of the family?"
More specifically, the inquiry should be directed to what extent and for how
long maintenance ought to fill the gap between what the former homemaker
can earn and her reasonable expenses. If presented with the facts that the
average homemaker loses 1.5% annually in earning capacity 232 and that a col-
lege-educated homemaker may lose as much as 4% annually,233 courts might
decide that a guideline of that much per year of marriage as a supplement to
earnings would be reasonable indefinitely. Without information on the effect of
foregone employment for ten to twenty years, judicial decisions must be made
on common knowledge and value judgments which differ widely on this issue.
There seem to be relatively few appeals from trial court orders for peri-
odic maintenance for spouses of medium-length marriages. There are a few
significant cases which treat the situation more like the long-term marriage.
Salient facts that indicate the appropriateness of substantial periodic mainte-
nance are discussed immediately below. The more active battleground between
1980 and 1984 on maintenance in the medium-length marriage has been on
the issue of limited duration maintenance. More often than not, the limits
have been reversed on appeal. This suggests that it is appropriate to treat the
duration of maintenance issue in the medium-length marriage more like that
of the long-term marriage than like the short-term.234
i. Illness, rehabilitative maintenance or special equities
The special added facts that made maintenance appropriate in the short-
term marriage warrant it in the medium length marriage, as well. Thus, illness
230. See Satterfield v. Satterfield, 635 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982);
Wachter v. Wachter, 645 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); In re Marriage of Hart-
zell, 634 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Worley v. Worley, 615 S.W.2d 561 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1981) (unclear if employment had continued throughout marriage).
231. Family economists could testify concerning opportunity costs. Formulas
have been developed for making cost calculations. See Smith & Beninger, Career Op-
portunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 213
(1982) (citing I. SAWHILL, DEVELOPING NORMATIVE STANDARDS FOR CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY PAYMENTS (1981)).
232. Mincer & Polachek, Women's Earnings Reexamined, 13 J. OF HUM. RE-
SOURCES 118, 122-34 (1978).
233. Mincer & Polacheck, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of
Women in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (T. Schultz ed. 1974).
234. These cases are discussed, infra, Basis for Durational Limits.
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of the wife in a ten year marriage led to a reversal of a time limit on mainte-
nance granted in Vogt v. Ketzner.235 Rehabilitative purposes could explain
Honeycutt v. Honeycutt,236 in which an award of periodic maintenance was
affirmed to a wife in a sixteen year marriage who was attending college to
obtain her degree. In addition, however, the court held it appropriate not to
limit the award to the time while being rehabilitated. Special equities of the
case justified maintenance even without the rehabilitative purpose. The wife
had worked in various menial jobs to help support the husband while he ob-
tained two college degrees. She had accompanied him overseas during military
service which prevented her from developing earning capacity through educa-
tion or employment. She then had and cared for their two sons and at the time
of the decree was receiving welfare payments while trying to gain her educa-
tion. These facts added to the prototype reveal a sequence of extraordinary
responsibility which benefited the husband and family and prevented the de-
velopment of her own capacities.
Another case indicating special equities is In re Marriage of Runez.23
The wife in this twenty year marriage was a Filipino native whose husband
married her while he was there in medical school. They had been in this coun-
try fifteen years but she still had some difficulty with English and had five
children in her custody aged ten through sixteen. It is apparent that leaving
her native land and having five children in quick succession had hampered and
still was hampering her in developing earning ability or obtaining employment.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's award of $300 a month for
thirty-six months by removing the durational limit and raising the amount to
$1,000 a month.
ii. High standard of living; ability to pay
A high marital standard of living and undoubted ability of the obligor to
pay account for some awards in the medium-length marriage. In re Marriage
of Pitluck238 involved a thirty-eight year old wife in an eighteen year marriage
involving a very high standard of living. She had two years of college but had
not been employed during the marriage and had custody of two teenagers.
There was no evidence of employability but there was some evidence concern-
ing health problems due to stress. Her expenses for herself were $1,060
monthly without insurance, mortgage, and home maintenance costs. The trial
court awarded only $350 a month which the husband who had an annual in-
come of $35,000 and expenses of $1,290 a month could pay easily. The west-
ern district appellate court reversed and increased the maintenance to $650.239
235. 634 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
236. In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983).
237. 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983).
238. 616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
239. The contrast in amount of maintenance between Pitluck ($650) and Cregan
v. Clark, 658 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983) ($1,000), both by the same judge,
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In Childers v. Childers,240 the Eastern District affirmed $1,300 a month to a
wife of only thirteen years who was employed and earned $553 a month. The
salient fact seemed to be that the husband earned seven times as much as she
and could pay easily. These cases indicate that, at least if it does not cause
sacrifice to the obligor, it is appropriate for the obligor to contribute substan-
tially to meeting the income/expense gap of the homemaker from a medium-
length marriage.
III. DURATIONAL LIMITS
A. In Gross and Durational Limits Authorized
In Doerflinger v. Doerflinger,41 the Missouri Supreme Court said that
section 452.335 covers the full range of support payments to a spouse, mainte-
nance for an indefinite term, maintenance for a limited period and mainte-
nance in gross. Maintenance for an indefinite term is traditional periodic
maintenance based on evidence of need for day-to-day support. Maintenance
for a limited period is periodic maintenance payable for a specified or limited
time duration, sometimes called terminable maintenance. One type of limited
maintenance is rehabilitative maintenance granted for purposes of obtaining
education or training. In gross maintenance is a specified sum of money paya-
ble either in a lump sum or in installments.
The authority of courts under the new law to order maintenance in gross
payable in a lump sum was litigated soon after passage of the new law. As
discussed supra,2 42 the early cases establishing the power to award in gross
was probably due to the difference in the obligor's income, $85,000 in Cregan, and the
amount of expenses the recipient had established, $3,500 monthly in Cregan.
240. 652 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
241. 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). The court so held in regard to
awards of money for "support." An award of money in the nature of property division
is authorized also, Fort v. Fort, 670 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984), but is not the
subject of this discussion. Many money awards are ambiguous in nature, arguably ei-
ther maintenance or property division. For example, in Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d
663 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), the parties did not dispute the appropriateness of the trial
court labeling a $30,000 award to equalize property division as "maintenance in gross"
and the Court upheld the award as part of property division. Some decisions indicate
that the purpose of the order should determine whether it is maintenance or property
division. For example, if the award represents part of the marital estate, it is property
division and, in the absence of the usual need requirements for maintenance, could not
be upheld as a maintenance award. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pehle, 622 S.W. 2d 711
(Mo. App., E.D. 1981 ); Fastnacht v. Fastnacht, 616 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. App., W.D.
1981); Rickelman v. Rickelman, 625 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Spicer v.
Spicer, 585 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979). Other decisions rely upon the trial
court's label as maintenance and only determine whether the requisites for mainte-
nance are present. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Goodrich, 667 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., S.D.
1984); Smith v. Smith, 561 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978). See also discussion
supra, Payment of Debts.
242. See supra Introduction, Statutory Structure.
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amounts did not rule on the power of a court to limit maintenance. Ordinarily,
they were cases in which the recipient had established some special need for
the lump sum amount and the appeal was by the obligor claiming no power to
impose such an obligation. Some courts held that section 452.080, which had
authorized alimony in gross prior to 1974 and which was not repealed by the
legislature, continued to allow in gross awards.243 These early opinions said a
policy reason for approving in gross awards against objection by the obligor
was the value of severing ties between the divorced people and allowing them a
new start without a continued monetary relation between them.244 In D.E. W.
v. M. W.,245 the court referred to the continuance of section 452.080 but held
that the language of new section 452.335 also authorized in gross awards. The
Missouri Supreme Court in Doerflinger2 41 stated that section 452.335 author-
ized in gross awards and added in footnote 3 its doubt that section 452.080
would ever be utilized because it would require proof that the wife was the
injured and innocent party.247 An in gross lump sum award ordered in combi-
nation with a periodic award was recognized as permissible in early litigation
also.2 18
Appellate courts were the first to use an in gross order payable in install-
ments over time rather than in a lump sum. 249 Although this is somewhat
inconsistent with the desire to sever ties, it represents a compromise by al-
lowing an extended but limited amount of time for payment to ease the burden
on the payor. In later cases, trial judges followed the example and often or-
dered an in gross amount payable in installments. No questions about author-
ity to allow installment payments were raised on appeal. 250
The authority to order maintenance awards of limited duration was rec-
ognized in In re Marriage of Powers251 as specifically granted by the statute.
In other early opinions which recognized the power to limit the duration of
periodic payments, with 252 and without 253 stairstepping or decreasing the
amounts periodically, the authority to do so was not questioned by appealing
parties.
243. Carr v. Carr, 556 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); see also In re Mar-
riage of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
244. D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
245. Id.
246. 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
247. Id. at 800 n.3.
248. Sawtell v. Sawtell, 569 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
249. D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Broyles v.
Broyles, 555 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
250. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); In re
Marriage of Arnett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
251. 527 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
252. Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., Spr. 1976) (appealing party
questioned only amount of award, not decreasing or terminating features).
253. Laney v. Laney, 535 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) (appeal on modifi-
cation, not on original order).
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B. Effect of In Gross and Limited Duration Awards
1. Not Modifiable
Section 452.370 permits modification of maintenance awards but "only as
to installments accruing subsequent to the motion." Therefore, under this stat-
ute, as was true under section 452.080, courts consistently held that an in
gross award payable in a lump sum was not subject to modification.2 " Doubt
continued for some time about an in gross amount payable in installments or a
periodic amount payable for a limited term. In Ethridge v. Ethridge,255 the
court held, after the term for payment had elapsed, the duration of a limited
maintenance award could not be modified. The reason was that section
452.370 refers only to modification of installments payable in the future and,
once the term has expired, there are no future payments upon which a modifi-
cation order would be operative.
In the most significant maintenance decision under the new Act, Doerflin-
ger v. Doerflinger,256 the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that limited term
maintenance is reviewable only on appeal and is not subject to modification at
any time for any reason.257 The appellant wife was suffering from multiple
sclerosis but, according to the trial court's findings in the original proceeding,
that would not be a great obstacle to obtaining full-time employment if she
would refrain from the use of intoxicants. The trial court entered a judgment
for $900 a month maintenance for one year after further finding that her ex-
cessive drinking was volitional and that "the respondent should have a year to
straighten out her life and become rehabilitated. 258 Since there had been no
appeal from the original judgment, there was no review of the adequacy of the
evidence to sustain these findings. Instead, the wife, after eight months and
before the term of payment had expired, filed a motion to modify to increase
the amount of maintenance and to make it payable for an unspecified and
ongoing time. She argued that limited term maintenance is not maintenance in
gross and that any award of periodic payments partakes of the attributes of
maintenance paid from time to time, thus permitting modification of any fu-
ture installments under section 452.370.
The supreme court in Doerflinger said that neither a maintenance award
ordered paid in a single installment nor an award of a predetermined amount
payable in multiple installments during a pre-set term is subject to modifica-
tion on a change of circumstances, but either can be reviewed only by appeal
of the original judgment. The court's reasoning is instructive. It clarified that
254. Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
255. 604 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
256. 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
257. This holding was consistent with one of the earliest decisions from the Kan-
sas City Court of Appeals, Laney v. Laney, 535 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976),
but it probably overruled a holding from the Eastern District, Jacobs v. Jacobs, 628
S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982). See discussion, infra, Termination on Remarriage.
258. 646 S.W.2d at 799.
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the substantive question in the case was the finality of the adjudication limit-
ing the maintenance obligation, and in that context, noted that the mainte-
nance statute does not presume a continued dependency of a spouse, but en-
courages self-sufficiency through a final and limited award at the initial stage.
The court stated that the common characteristic of both a lump sum in gross
award and a limited duration award is that the trial court had rejected the
necessity for an indefinite continuation of support.259
In an extended discussion, the supreme court in Doerflinger emphasized
that a limited duration award was proper only if supported by sufficient evi-
dence, subject to review on appeal. The Doerflinger situation illustrates the
extreme effect of the court's non-modifiability holding. Mrs. Doerflinger, suf-
fering from multiple sclerosis, was found to need at least $900 a month in
support at the time of the decree and her spouse was found able to pay it.
Without regard to actual change in either her medical condition, her drinking,
or the husband's ability to pay, all maintenance automatically ceased only a
year later. Apparently, it was in recognition of the drastic effect of its holding
on non-modifiability that the supreme court so carefully explained that, al-
though the initial limitation on maintenance was authorized for the purpose of
encouraging self-sufficiency, there must be adequate evidence to justify imposi-
tion of the limitation.
2. Termination on Remarriage
Section 452.370 provides that maintenance is "terminated upon . . . re-
marriage of the party receiving maintenance." A similar provision in the for-
mer law was that remarriage relieved the obligor from further payments with-
out the necessity of court action.28 0 In contrast, the obligation to pay a lump
sum in gross award survives both remarriage and death.261 Since the courts
had held that an in gross sum payable in installments does not lose its in gross
characteristics, 262 it is not surprising that the in gross installment payment
obligation is not terminated by remarriage. 63 Following the decision in Doer-
flinger,26' it was held that a limited duration monthly award of maintenance
also survived remarriage. In Mottel v. Mottel,265 the decree ordered $400 a
month for forty-eight months. When the recipient remarried, the obligor filed
259. Id. at 801.
260. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.075 (1978).
261. Terrell v. Terrell, 582 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); accord Swanson
v. Swanson, 464 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1971) (under former law); cf Gunkel v. Gunkel,
633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 628 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1982).
262. D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
263. Gunkel v. Gunkel, 633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982). But see Desloge
v. Desloge, 617 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (characterizing amount payable in
installments as periodic and holding terminated by remarriage).
264. Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
265. 664 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
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a motion to modify and the court held, quoting Doerflinger, that the obligation
was equivalent to a lump sum award and not modifiable.266 The decision,
thereby, superseded a contrary holding in Jacobs v. Jacobs.267 The Mottel de-
cision extends the non-modifiability rule of Doerflinger to the remarriage situ-
ation where the statute had appeared to provide for automatic termination of
the obligation. Assuming that it is appropriate to treat remarriage the same as
other bases for modification, Doerflinger requires that remarriage have no ef-
fect on limited duration maintenance awards. This means that the limited du-
ration award carries risks for not only the recipient whose need may extend
beyond the term, but also for the obligor who otherwise would have been able
to terminate his periodic obligation simply by showing remarriage of the
recipient.
3. Award as Lien on Realty
Section 452.080 of the former law (which has not been repealed) provides
that in gross alimony is automatically a lien on the obligor's real property.
Courts which have assumed that section 452.080 is the source of the power to
order in gross maintenance have stated that the automatic lien continues as a
characteristic of in gross maintenance. 268 This would be true of the sum paya-
ble in installments as well as the periodic amount with limited duration under
Doerflinger's statement that all three methods of payment are equivalent.
However, there are two serious uncertainties about drawing such a conclusion.
First, Doerflinger held the three methods equivalent only in regard to the fi-
nality of the order for purposes of modification. Second, Doerflinger held that
section 452.335 was the authority for all types of maintenance orders and sug-
gested that section 452.080 rarely would be utilized now.269 If that is the case,
the automatic lien provisions of section 452.080 would not apply to any award
of maintenance, in gross or limited duration. A recipient desiring a lien proba-
bly should request the court to decree specifically a lien as security for any
type of maintenance payment. 270
C. Basis for Durational Limit
1. Substantial Evidence Required
During the first decade under the 1974 law, Missouri appellate courts
266. Id. at 27.
267. 628 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
268. Gunkel v. Gunkel, 633 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); D.E.W. v.
M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (court gave need for additional secur-
ity as a reason for utilizing the in gross form for maintenance).
269. Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798, 800 n.3 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
270. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.345 was amended in 1984 to permit the court to
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affirmed twelve significant durational limits on maintenance,271 the first being
in 1978, and reversed approximately twenty-two limits272 starting in 1975.273
Because of the abuse of discretion standard for review, the large number of
reversals of durational limits is particularly significant. This close monitoring
by the appellate courts is understandable when both the situation in which the
durational limit is utilized and the effect of the limit are clearly delineated.
The situation is always that the party requesting maintenance has established
need at the time of the decree, but the effect of the durational limit under the
271. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 688 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985); Etling v.
Etling, 671 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 669 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., E.D.
1984); Felkner v. Felkner, 652 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Rasmussen v. Ras-
mussen, 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Sansone v. Sansone, 615 S.W.2d
670 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Kreienheder, 610 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1980); Anderson v. Anderson, 605 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980);
Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Raines v. Raines, 583
S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Hebron v. Hebron, 566 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1978); cf. Standridge v. Adams, 636 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982) (en-
forcement action).
272. Clements v. Clements, 688 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985); Hutchins v.
Hutchins, 687 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985); Hefti v. Hefti, 682 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1984); In re Marriage of Goodding, 677 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. App., W.D.
1984); Blount v. Blount, 674 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); In re Marriage of
Runez, 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); Wasson v. Wasson, 657 S.W.2d 683
(Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Turner v. Turner, 650 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983);
Geil v. Geil, 647 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); Moseley v. Moseley, 642 S.W.2d
953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); Vogt v. Ketzner, 634 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982);
Tygett v. Tygett, 639 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 613
S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Royal v. Royal, 617 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App., W.D.
1981); Phelps v. Phelps, 620 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Wisdom v. Wisdom,
613 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Wofford, 589 S.W.2d 323
(Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Poague v. Poague, 579 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979);
Ruth v. Ruth, 560 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); In re Marriage of Valleroy,
548 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501
(Mo. App., St. L. 1977); In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., St. L.
1975); see also In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983)
(affirmed periodic without limit against obligor's argument for limit); Nixon v. Nixon,
525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975) (rehabilitative subject to modification rather
than limited).
273. In addition, there are a number of decisions that indicate nothing other
than that it is appropriate to impose a lump sum or limited duration award on an
obligor. These are cases in which the recipient either asked for the limited amount or
accepted it without appeal. See, e.g., Layton v. Layton, 673 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1984); Mills v. Mills, 663 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983); In re Marriage of
Sharp, 630 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Elliott v. Elliott, 621 S.W.2d 305
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (lump sum); Miller v. Miller, 553 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1977) (lump sum); see also In re Marriage of Daniel, 639 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. App.,
S.D. 1982) (limited duration); Roth v. Roth, 620 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981)
(limited duration); J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (limited
duration); Kerns v. Kerns, 552 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977) (limited duration).
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non-modifiability rule of Doerflinger,'7 ' is the same as a delayed denial of
maintenance, i.e., after the durational period runs, maintenance is denied for-
ever. The supreme court in Doerflinger implied that it expected careful scru-
tiny of a durational limit when it stated unequivocally,
A limited award of maintenance follows an appraisal of future events.
Whether a decision to limit maintenance is or is not appropriate in the cir-
cumstances depends not upon reassessment by hindsight, but upon whether
there was substantial evidence at the time [of the decree] to justify imposi-
tion of the limitation.2 75
The requirement of substantial evidence to justify the limitation is in accord
with the earliest appellate decision27 6 reversing a limit on maintenance after
adoption of the Murphy v. Carron277 abuse of discretion standard for review,
but the supreme court stated it affirmatively and more strongly than appellate
courts in recent years usually have done.27 1
The court did not explain what it meant by "substantial evidence." It
quoted an intermediate court of appeals opinion 279 to the effect that "specula-
tion" will not suffice, but neither is "certainty" required to justify a time limit.
At this point the court was discussing the probability necessary to meet the
burden of persuasion. In any case involving a durational limit, petitioner would
have established a basis for maintenance at the time of the decree and the
effect of the limitation under Doerflinger would be to terminate that mainte-
nance. Therefore, the court was addressing the burden of persuasion of the
obligor. The appraisal of future events cannot be speculation but need not be a
certainty. This suggests that the burden of persuasion remains the same as in
a traditional jury tried case, i.e., the party with the burden of persuasion must
present evidence to convince the trier that the existence of the challenged facts
is more probable than not. In a recent non-maintenance case the supreme
court held more clearly that the Murphy v. Carron standard of substantial
evidence means evidence sufficient to sustain a belief that the facts were more
probable than not.280
Ambiguous terminology in intermediate appellate court opinions supports
this conclusion. There are many loose statements such as, "[t]he evidence
must show circumstances would likely change ' 28 and "[t]here rihust be some
274. 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
275. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
276. LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
277. 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
278. See, e.g., Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 669 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. App., E.D.
1984) (stating the "decree. . . will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence
to support it").
279. Sansone v. Sansone, 615 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
280. Midstate Oil v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 846
(Mo. 1984) (en banc) (requires evidence "which would have probative force on the
issues").
281. In re Marriage of Runez, 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983); see also
Moseley v. Moseley, 642 S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982) (noting no evidence
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reasonable expectation"2 2 of the result; but again and again, a statement rec-
ognizes the necessity that the likelihood be more probable than not. For exam-
ple, courts have said that: it is not sufficient for the evidence to disclose "only
the possibility" 28 3 of change; the court may consider "probable future pros-
pects"; 28' or the limitation was erroneous because there was "no reasonable
probability" 285 of the justification occurring.
Since the supreme court's opinion in Doerflinger should be interpreted to
mean that the appraisal of future events must be supported by evidence indi-
cating it is more probable than not the justifying future events will occur,
these statements connoting the traditional probability are correct and those
which say the limitation is permissible if there is a "reasonable expectation"286
of the justification are incorrect.
2. Ultimate Justifying Facts
a. Ability to Meet Reasonable Needs
The supreme court did not address what ultimate facts must be shown by
the substantial evidence in order to constitute a justification. From the begin-
ning, appellate court opinions which reversed limits on duration in all three
districts stated that to justify imposition of the durational limit, the evidence
must establish the ultimate fact of ability on the petitioner's part to close the
gap between income and need.28' The St. Louis Court of Appeals in In re
Marriage of Powers288 said "her income shows no likelihood of catching up
with her living expenses. . . . [T]he court should not speculate that in seven
years the wife's income could meet her living expenses." LoPiccolo v. LoPic-
colo289 said, the record does not "constitute substantial evidence of petitioner's
"tending to show" the future event).
282. McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); San-
sone v. Sansone, 615 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
283. Blount v. Blount, 674 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
284. In re Marriage of Runez, 666 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983).
285. Vogt v. Ketzner, 634 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
286. McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984). The
"some reasonable expectation" language originated in dicta in In re Marriage of Pow-
ers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975), and never has been analyzed con-
cerning the degree of probability necessary to impose a durational limit. Sansone v.
Sansone, 615 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981), and Doerflinger v. Doerflinger,
646 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), state only that more than speculation and
less than certainty is required.
287. The courts also have recognized that changes in other circumstances, nota-
bly the obligor's ability to pay, could justify a durational limit. However, only one case
has been found that involved an alleged inability circumstance. Moseley v. Moseley,
642 S.W.2d 953 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982), reversed a limit reducing the amount of main-
tenance when the obligor reached age 65, stating that the evidence did not establish
that he would not be able to pay the ordered amount at that time.
288. 527 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975) (emphasis added).
289. 547 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (emphasis added); accord
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future ability to provide for her reasonable needs." In Phelps v. Phelps,"0 the
western district said that in the interest of social welfare and justice the hus-
band has the duty to contribute such amount as will, supplemented by the
wife's earnings, allow the wife to maintain the standard of living enjoyed at
the time of dissolution. The southern district in In re Marriage of
Honeycutt291 quoted Powers that the court should not speculate that "the
wife's income could meet her living expenses." These decisions cover the
gamut of long-term, 29 2 medium-length,2 93 and short-term marriages;29' in all
the requirement for a durational limit is substantial evidence showing ability
to meet needs.
This test follows closely the tradition of utilizing motions to modify to
assess whether changes in circumstances justify a change in the award. The
test conforms well with the purpose of maintenance to remedy loss of earning
capacity by compensating for it through meeting the gap between reasonable
needs and the maximum income the recipient can produce. After a long-term
marriage when it is fair to set reasonable needs at the level needed to maintain
the standard of living of the marriage, reasonable needs are equal to living
expenses. Thus, permitting durational limits only when the evidence shows the
recipient otherwise will be able to meet living expenses is consistent with those
cases ordering maintenance for the purpose of meeting the income/reasonable
needs gap as fully as possible. To impose the time limit requires substantial
evidence tending to show that the recipient's future income will cover expenses
at least as well as the income plus the maintenance award meets them at time
of the decree.
Obviously, "a meeting living expenses" test does not apply to the situation
in which the recipient sought only rehabilitative maintenance in the first in-
stance. The reasonable need for which maintenance was sought had a built-in
duration to it. This is particularly evident in the short-term marriage where
maintenance probably would not have been ordered other than for education
or training. The two cases in which limited duration maintenance for rehabili-
tative purposes was first recognized are such reasonable needs cases. In Raines
v. Raines,295 the court affirmed a two year limit on maintenance for schooling
Murphy v. Murphy, 613 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
290. 620 S.W.2d .462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (reversed in gross award and en-
tered nominal periodic order without discussion of limitations). The same court in the
fall of 1984 held there is "no substantial evidence appellant will be able to meet her
living expenses, therefore the provision for termination of maintenance must be re-
versed." In re Marriage of Goodding, 677 S.W.2d 332, 337 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
291. 649 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (affirming periodic against
argument of obligor that a limit should have been imposed).
292. Tygett v. Tygett, 639 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
293. In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983);
LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
294. Murphy v. Murphy, 613 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Phelps v.
Phelps, 620 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
295. 583 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
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to a wife of a less than two year marriage stating that the length of the mar-
riage was of particular consequence. In Pederson v. Pederson,96 the appellate
court imposed the durational limit because the wife had requested mainte-
nance for schooling purposes and was otherwise self-sufficient after only a six
year marriage. A similar case is Standridge v. Adams,297 where the court af-
firmed maintenance conditioned on attendance at school. In contrast are situa-
tions where the evidence does not indicate that the period of education will
enable the recipient to close the gap between what can be earned even with the
schooling and reasonable needs.298 The courts have recognized that if there are
reasonable needs in addition to the rehabilitation, then a durational limit
based on the rehabilitation period alone is not justified.
Because the underlying issue regarding limited duration maintenance is
reasonable needs on the basis of all the relevant factors, a "meeting living
expenses" test is not appropriate for a short-term marriage without special
equities. In that situation, reasonable needs are not equivalent to living ex-
penses, because the combination of factors that make it just for maintenance
fully to meet needs either in terms of amount or duration is not present. For
example, in the prototype short-term marriage, less maintenance per month
and less total maintenance measured in durational terms may be reasonable
simply because not much earning capacity had been lost nor much benefit
conferred on the obligor nor had any extraordinary sacrifices or pressures upon
the recipient been endured. That reasonable needs is the key to limited dura-
tion maintenance is illustrated graphically by Rasmussen v. Rasmussen.99
The appellate court held that the main factor justifying an in gross award
payable in two years rather than indefinite periodic maintenance was the mis-
conduct of the recipient.800 This analysis suggests that when the courts have
stated a "meeting the gap" or living expenses test for durational maintenance
they almost surely are referring to meeting a gap between income and reason-
able needs.
b. "Markedly Different" or Impending Change
An expected difference or change in future financial circumstances in it-
self has not been a sufficient basis for limiting the duration of maintenance, in
spite of language in the Powers opinion suggesting change as an alternative
basis for justifying limits. The Powers court in analyzing the evidence before
it, also, said that there was no evidence "the circumstances of the parties
would be markedly different" and that all the evidence indicates the wife's
296. 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
297. 636 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
298. In re Marriage of Honeycutt, 649 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983);
Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
299. 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
300. Id. at 120.
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financial prospects "will not improve dramatically."801 The Powers court then
compounded the confusion by stating affirmatively, "[a]wards of limited dura-
tion are entirely proper where the trial court has before it evidence of some
impending change in the financial conditions of the parties." 02 This particular
language, when considered without reference to the Powers court's use of the
"meeting reasonable needs" test, carries a very different connotation. It sug-
gests that if the evidence at the time of trial shows that a marked or dramatic
change will occur in the financial prospects of the recipient (or the obligor),
the impending change will warrant a predetermined denial of maintenance
even though the change will not close the gap between income and reasonable
needs.
The pattern of reversals and affirmances of durational limits demonstrates
that substantial evidence of a marked difference in circumstances alone will
not justify a limit on the duration of a maintenance award. The decisions in-
stead indicate that the impending change or the marked difference must be in
relation to the ability to meet reasonable needs. The large number of reversals
of limited maintenance is in itself dramatic. By the fall of 1984 every dura-
tional limit on maintenance to the prototype long-term traditional home-
maker had been reversed.303 There are no affirmances. This is probably be-
cause impending change in the circumstances of an older, long-term
homemaker whose lost earning capacity is beyond significant rehabilitation is
not likely to indicate that she will meet her reasonable needs. For example, in
Royal v. Royal,30° the trial court had found that, on the basis of past employ-
ment, within a year of the decree the wife would be able to be employed. But
the appellate court noted that past employment was inconclusive to establish
that she could be self-supporting 05 In Tygett v. Tygett,306 the wife of a
twenty-two year marriage just had finished a refresher course on secretarial
skills, but the appellate court, mentioning her age and inexperience, reversed a
two year limit, holding that there was not substantial evidence that she would
be able to get a job that would enable her to meet her living expenses. In
Turner v. Turner,30 7 the appellate court reversed a two year limit on mainte-
nance to a fifty-four-year-old woman who had a physical disability but who
301. In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
302. Id. at 956.
303. One possible aberration is Hebron v. Hebron, 566 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1978). However, the length of the marriage, 21 years, and the age of the wife,
42, were both at the lower end of the long-term group and the wife was atypical in that
she had been successfully employed for a long period of years. She was working part-
time at the time of trial because of a problem which the court was convinced was
temporary. Thus, she could not claim that long years of homemaking rather than em-
ployment had decreased her earning ability significantly. See also Wilhelm v. Wilhelm,
688 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985) (demonstrates self-sufficiency).
304. 617 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
305. Id. at 620; see also Hefti v. Hefti, 682 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
306. 639 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
307. 650 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
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planned to attend school after a thirty-five year marriage, saying that there
was no evidence she would be self-supporting.
Blount v. Blount 08 is a crucial 1984 decision in the eastern district. After
quoting the "markedly different circumstances" language, the court stated
that it was error to limit maintenance where evidence failed to disclose that
the dependent spouse "will be self-supporting."30 9 The court reversed a limit of
four years based on the time that the youngest child would reach age eighteen.
The evidence had shown the thirty-eight-year-old wife in a nineteen year mar-
riage was in good health and that fifteen years earlier she had been employed
as a secretary. The court noted that the standard of living had been high, the
husband earned $140,000 and could meet his own needs while meeting hers,
and that the wife had no other source of income. The court said that whether
the wife would be in good health and self-supporting in four years was unpre-
dictable. It declared only the latter type of proof sufficient to limit the award.
When the "markedly different" or "impending change" language of all these
decisions is considered in view of their facts, the conclusion is inescapable that
to limit the duration of maintenance, substantial evidence is required to show
that at the end of the time, the recipient will be able to meet her reasonable
needs.
c. Employability
Five decisions from the eastern district affirming limits on maintenance
suggest a new judicially created restriction on maintenance, at least in the
medium-length marriage. By the fall of 1984 none of the cases affirming limits
on maintenance concerned a long-term marriage. The eleven decisions which
had affirmed limits on the duration of maintenance included two true rehabili-
tative maintenance cases,310 one involving a wife who had been employed full-
time for many years,311 one justified by misconduct of the recipient,31 2 one
from a two year marriage granted until her needs stated in dollars were other-
wise met,313 and one, prior to Doerflinger, erroneously holding that in gross
awards were different than limited duration awards.31" The five remaining
cases all involve medium-length marriages.
Sansone v. Sansone,315 decided in 1981, involved a twelve year marriage,
308. 674 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
309. Id. at 614.
310. Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Raines v.
Raines, 583 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); cf. Standridge v. Adams, 636 S.W.2d
680 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
311. Hebron v. Hebron, 566 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. App., W.D. 1978); see also Wil-
helm v. Wilhelm, 688 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985) (wife left family and sup-
ported self for two years prior to decree).
312. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 627 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
313. Anderson v. Anderson, 605 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
314. In re Marriage of Kreienheder, 610 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
315. 615 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
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and two children in the custody of the thirty-five-year-old wife, who was not
employed out of the home during the marriage except for a brief period as a
retail salesperson. This is the prototype medium-length marriage with a tradi-
tional full-time homemaker. The trial court's award of $400 a month limited
to one year was affirmed. The appellate opinion did not mention two of the
statutory factors for determining maintenance: standard of living during the
marriage and the obligor's earnings and ability to pay maintenance. After
quoting from Powers concerning evidence of impending change, it stated the
relevant evidence as being that the wife was trained as a real estate appraiser
(completed a fifteen week course nine months prior to trial) and that there was
a market for real estate appraisers. The market evidence was that there were
job opportunities with a beginning salary at $10,000 to $12,000. The crucial
portion of the opinion was the court's statements that the maintenance was
"for a reasonable period so that wife could adjust to a new pattern of life and
obtain employment" and that the evidence supported the conclusion "that
within a year wife would have employment, if she sought it."318 There was no
mention of the Powers language about change which would indicate ability to
meet reasonable needs and, indeed, there was no discussion whatever of rea-
sonable needs. Without considering evidence of the marriage standard of liv-
ing, no proper conclusion could be drawn on what were her reasonable needs
or the extent to which the petitioner's earning capacity enabled her to meet
them. Instead, the only evidence discussed was that pertaining to her ability to
become employed. The implied assumption is that employability per se is the
determinant of maintenance, i.e., employability precludes maintenance without
regard to the extent that reasonable needs will be met. It follows that evidence
of employability with a short period in which to obtain a job would justify
denial of maintenance.
In 1984, the Sansone decision was cited in McDowell v. McDowell31 7 for
the following proposition: "If the evidence supports the finding that the wife is
qualified for employment by physical ability and training and there is a rea-
sonable expectation she will have employment during the period if she seeks it,
the award of maintenance limited to that period is justified." 318 The McDowell
marriage probably had lasted twelve to fourteen years since the wife was
thirty-eight years old and there were three minor children. This woman previ-
ously had taught school for six years and had two college degrees. The trial
court awarded $1,000 a month for two years. Again, the opinion did not men-
tion standard of living or reasonable needs but articulated that the ultimate
question is whether circumstances of the parties will be markedly different. It
held that it was not unreasonable to anticipate "an assumption by the wife of
her own financial responsibility within a period of two years." 319 Clearly, the
evidence would support a finding that the wife could be employed in two years.
316. Id. at 671.
317. 670 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
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But, the opinion shifted from using as criteria for maintenance ability to meet
reasonable needs to using as criteria employability alone.
Within a month Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer 20 was decided, relying on
Sansone for the "employment" and "adjustment" to a new pattern of life test.
In Steinmeyer, the wife was forty years old with no health problems, had a
thirteen year old daughter in custody, and had been employed for two years
prior to the marital separation, earning about $563 a month at the time of the
decree. She was awarded $230 a month child support and $400 monthly main-
tenance for three years. Although her monthly expenses were indicated at
$1,242, leaving an unmet need of nearly $500, the court said that the evidence
would have supported a finding that she was able without assistance of the
husband to supply her own needs. Therefore, the court said, "She cannot now
complain that the trial judge granted her only three years to adjust to her new
life." 321 The court did not state length of marriage, standard of living, or the
husband's ability to pay. Employability alone became the test. Except for the
highly questionable decision in Geil v. Geil,322 previous authority would not
have permitted denial of maintenance if the marriage had been long and the
husband was able to pay. Steinmeyer could be even more questionable than
-the first two decisions because the marriage may have been twenty years or
slightly longer in duration. In the long-term traditional homemaker marriage
the body of precedent on reasonable needs and on limited duration suggest
that employability alone never would be sufficient to deny or limit
maintenance.
Etling v. Etling,323 also decided in 1984, is an enigma with sparse facts
and no reasoning stated. The trial court granted $200 a month for twenty-four
months for a total of $4,800 rather than the wife's requested $75 a week (ap-
proximately $300 a month) for six to nine months for a total of $2,700 to train
as a medical assistant. The wife appealed and the award was affirmed, the
court saying that the maintenance was "for a reasonable period so that wife
could adjust to a new pattern of life and obtain gainful employment."3 24 One
hardly can question affirming an award that gave her more total dollars than
she had requested, but the court's reasoning followed the newly formulated
and restrictive "adjustment" purpose for maintenance that first surfaced in
Sansone.
Felkner v. Felkner,325 like Etling, records so few facts that it is impossible
to analyze it appropriately. In affirming a two year limit, the court said there
was evidence to uphold a finding that the wife "is capable, after a period of
320. 669 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
321. Id. at 68.
322. Geil v. Geil, 647 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983), discussed supra, Pro-
totype Fact Combinations, Long-term Traditional Homemaker.
323. 671 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
324. Id. at 825-26.
325. 652 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
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training and adjustment, of supporting herself." 32 6 Without facts given, the
"adjustment" phrase places the case in the Sansone line.
These five decisions utilize a new concept of maintenance under the Mis-
souri statute which has not been enunciated elsewhere. The concept that em-
ployability precludes maintenance after a short "adjustment" period is an un-
warranted departure from the legislative intent that all the statutory factors be
considered in determining amount and duration of maintenance. Furthermore,
the concept seriously deviates from innumerable precedents since 1974 that do
weigh all the factors to arrive at a decision upon a combination of them.
The only possible rationale for these decisions within the parameters of
the statute would be that in the medium-length marriage, reasonable needs
could never exceed the amount which the homemaker wife is able to provide
for herself within a short period after the marriage ends. Maintenance would
become a short-term aid to adjusting to a lowered standard of living. It would
be "adjustment maintenance." This would ignore the decrease in earning ca-
pacity during the ten to twenty years out of the employment market. Such a
draconian effect would be contrary to the purpose of maintenance as a remedy
for that decrease.
d. Resolution
The majority and dissenting opinions in Blount v. Blount127 brought to a
dramatic climax on the battleground of limited maintenance the conflicting
interpretations of the nature and purpose of maintenance. The reversal of a
four year limit represented a victory for the "reasonable needs" forces over the
"employability" or "adjustment maintenance" forces. The majority opinion set
out detailed evidence on all the factors that normally affect a finding of rea-
sonable needs including the high standard of living during the marriage, the
husband's $140,000 income, and the fact that the wife had not been employed
for fifteen years. It noted that the wife was wholly dependent on the husband
and that the sufficiency of $2,200 maintenance had not been appealed. The
opinion then reviewed both the supreme court's statement in Doerflinger that
there must be substantial evidence at the time of the decree to justify an impo-
sition of a limitation and the markedly different language of Powers, and con-
cluded that only evidence that appellant would be self-supporting in four years
would justify the limit. The majority did not explain what it meant by "self-
supporting," but its reference to the high standard of living and the $2,200
amount suggests strongly that it was concerned with the gap between what she
could earn and the amount which represented her reasonable needs at the time
of the decree.
In contrast, the dissenting judge emphasized that, as soon as the youngest
326. Id. at 176.
327. 674 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984) (application for transfer to the Su-
preme Court denied). See discussion, supra, at note 308.
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child was out of school, the wife would have no reason to remain home and.
that she was "skilled and experienced at secretarial work, which is one of the
more valuable and important tasks in society."3 8 He pointed out the great
demand for secretaries and that the "wife would have four years' notice that
her maintenance would end" during which she could seek further training. His
concern was exclusively with her ability to become employed, not with whether
a secretarial position could provide income sufficient to meet reasonable needs
of $2,200. The probabilities are that she could earn only $500 to $1,000 a
month at that time. 29 The dissent would reduce her to a poverty level stan-
dard of living in four years even though the husband would be earning over
$140,000 partially due to her supportive efforts during the nineteen years of
the marriage in which his earning capacity developed. In contrast, the dissent's
apparent goal of providing secretaries for the needs of society and creating an
incentive for this woman to be productive would be met simply by lowering the
maintenance when she reasonably could be prepared for employment to the
amount needed to meet the gap between what she could earn and her reasona-
ble needs. 330 That would be incentive enough to seek employment and is why
nearly all able-bodied displaced homemakers in Missouri reported opinions
were employed or trying to obtain employment. The majority chose the "rea-
sonable needs" route as the required basis for limiting the duration of mainte-
nance, and did it in a manner that excludes either "marked difference" or
"employability" as a sufficient basis for a durational limit.
The Blount decision leaves the law on limited maintenance still teetering
uncertainly. The marriage in Blount had lasted nineteen years and the wife
had been out of the work force fifteen years. Should the case be classed as a
long-term marriage where no durational limit on maintenance yet has been
upheld or as a medium-length marriage? If the latter, it would be consistent
with those periodic maintenance cases that appear to treat the medium length
marriage more like the long-term one, thus, recognizing the loss of earning
capacity suffered there, also.331 Perhaps most significant, neither the majority
nor the dissenting opinion clarified what was the essential issue: should the
reasonable needs of a dependent homemaker include meeting the gap between
income and living expenses based on the marriage standard of living indefi-
328. Id. at 615 (Reinhard, J., dissenting).
329. See supra notes 102, 105 and 110 (cases discussing amounts earned by
women of comparable experience); see also supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Cregan v. Clark, 658 S.W.2d 924, 929 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983),
stating that even with $1,000 monthly maintenance, "Mrs. Clark would still have to
supplement that income from personal earnings, and Mr. Clark's fears were unfounded
that he would have to continue to support her in idleness and luxury." See discussion,
supra, at notes 102-06.
331. The dissenting judge in Blount recently demonstrated his judicial tempera-
ment by writing an opinion reversing a durational limit after a sixteen year marriage in
which he cites Blount to support his conclusion that the "evidentiary requirement
seems to have resulted in a judicial preference for awards of unlimited maintenance."
Hutchins v. Hutchins, 687 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Mo. App., E.D. 1985).
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nitely? It is obvious that the dissent, espousing the "employment" theory
would say "No." But it is unclear what the majority meant by "self-support-
ing." Self-supporting could mean able to meet the gap between income and
expenses to maintain the marriage standard of living. The amount of mainte-
nance ordinarily ordered from an obligor easily able to pay, even when the
income/living expense gap concept of reasonable needs is applied in the long-
term marriage, almost never is adequate to meet that gap fully.3 32 Thus, even
with unlimited periodic maintenance, courts not only have been creating an
incentive to seek employment, but also have been requiring an adjustment to a
lower standard of living by the modest amounts awarded.333 Under Doerflin-
ger, once the durational limit is imposed, the maintenance ends. To terminate
the help provided by an already inadequate award after a short period of time
cannot be justified. The probabilities are that lost earning capacity in either a
long-term or medium-length traditional marriage never can be recouped fully,
and that some maintenance to supplement earnings, therefore, more often than
not, can be justified indefinitely as a reasonable need.3"
IV. CONCLUSION
For nearly ten years Missouri courts have favored awards of periodic
maintenance of unlimited duration to homemakers from long-term and me-
dium-length marriages and rehabilitative awards for training or education to
shorter term homemakers who demonstrate need and abililty to increase their
skills. Reasonable need in the long-term marriage is measured by the standard
of living of the marriage. Generally, the awards to the long-term homemaker
seek to meet the gap between those needs and the amount the homemaker can
provide from her own earnings and property. To a large extent, awards to
homemakers in medium-length marriages also follow this pattern. As remedy
for the opportunity costs of socially desirable homemaking this measurement
for maintenance is appropriate.
However, the need gap seldom is met fully by the awards granted. Some-
times this is because the obligor does not have the means to pay. However,
disparity in income between the ex-spouses in many cases indicates that the
trend to protect the obligor's standard of living at the expense of ex-wives and
children, which has been noted in numerous studies in the country335 exists in
332. See cases discussed supra at note 105.
333. See, e.g., the amount ordered in Geil, 647 S.W.2d at 162.
334. Inheritance of income-producing property, remarriage, or a miraculously
high paying employment opportunity can be presented as grounds for modification or
termination. To qualify for income tax deductibility under the Tax Reform Act of
1984, § 422 amending I.R.C. § 71, if the amount payable in one year exceeds $10,000,
the payments must extend for at least six years and be terminable only by remarriage
or death.
335. J. CASSETrY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY 64, 65 (1978); D. CHAM-
BERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979); Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives, and Di-
vorce in FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES - PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
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Missouri, as well. Better trial preparation to document a petitioner's need and
opportunity costs suffered by her homemaking may rekindle consideration of
the legislative aims and encourage courts to lessen the disparity in economic
condition between the ex-spouses.
The most extreme indications of restrictions on maintenance which would
change its societal purpose are: (1) amount of awards so far below needs, even
though the obligor could pay more, that maintenance is converted from a rem-
edy for irremediable sacrifices due to homemaking to merely a protection for
taxpayers by substituting for welfare payments and, (2) duration of awards so
limited in time that maintenance is converted from a remedy for diminished
earning capacity to an aid in adjusting to a substantially lower standard of
living. A tendency to restrict maintenance in these ways has appeared recently
in cases involving medium-length marriages. Decisions which reverse inade-
quate maintenance amounts and which reverse durational limits in the absence
of substantial evidence that the recipient will be able to meet needs should be
applauded. Never are the awards so munificent that able-bodied recipients lose
incentive to be productive employees. Rather, they supplement the meager
amounts that can be earned. By assuring those awards, the appellate courts
further the legislative intent to protect the homemaking role by continuing
maintenance as a remedy for contributions and sacrifices for the welfare of the
family.
As the issues of amount and duration of maintenance arise in the future,
particularly in the medium-length marriage, courts should consider not only
the legislative intent, but also the broader social impact of extremely inade-
quate maintenance awards. Most of the medium-length marriages have minor
children who remain in the custody of the mother. Impoverishment of women
and children is a nationwide problem of serious concern. Between 1960 and
1981 the percentage of the total population in poverty decreased to approxi-
mately fourteen percent, but the number of persons in impoverished house-
holds headed by women increased fifty-four percent while those headed by
poor men decreased fifty percent. 338 Custodial women, unlike poor men, are
less able to escape poverty 37 because of the burden of child care, the extra
(1976); Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce, FAM. ADVOC.. (Spring 1979). On the
basis of per capita funds available to meet needs, in California women and children
experienced a 73% decline in standard of living while men experienced a 42% increase
in money available for their needs after dissolution. Weitzman, The Economics of Di-
vorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1266 (1981).
336. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION No. 78, A
GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN 2 (1983); see also
Kessler, Crisis in Child Support, 20 TRIAL 28 (1984); Testimony of Lt. Gov. Leo T.
McCarthy reported in CALIFORNIA WOMEN 1 (June/July 1983) (citing the 1981 Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Economic Opportunity).
337. Testimony of Dr. Diana Pearce, Director of Research, Center for Policy
Review, Catholic University Law School, reported in CALIFORNIA WOMEN 1 (June/
July 1983). She recommended that child care and job training were essentials to allevi-
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cost of children seldom covered adequately by child support,338 and because
the labor market is not as advantageous for women as for men.339
The classic study by Weitzman in California documented the adverse ef-
fects on both women and children who were impoverished as a result of the
marriage dissolution while the men enjoyed improved financial condition. She
concluded:
[T]hese minimal spousal support awards created severe pressures and hard-
ships for newly divorced women . . . impelling them into low-level jobs to
meet short-term necessities at the sacrifice of long-term benefits for them-
selves, their children, and even their former husbands.
These economic changes have drastic psychosocial effects on children.
The sharp decline in their mothers' standard of living forces residential
moves, with resulting changes of schools, teachers, neighbors, and friends.
Mothers pressured to earn money have less time and energy to devote to their
children, just when the children need their mothers most. Moreover, when the
discrepancy in standard of living between children and father is great, chil-
dren are likely to feel angry and resentful and to share their mothers' feeling
of deprivation and injustice. 4 0
In addition to recommendations concerning economic protection for chil-
dren, Weitzman recommended generous and protracted spousal support
awards for younger women while they acquire an education sufficient to utilize
their abilities fully. Many homemakers in the medium-length marriage would
fall within this group. Weitzman's other recommendation concerns mainte-
nance related to older divorced women whose earning capacities had been im-
paired in marriages of long duration. This would include some older home-
makers from the medium-length marriage who are beyond significant
improvement in earning ability. She said:
[They] need support rules that equalize the net income available to both
spouses after divorce. Old-fashioned norms of redistributive justice and simple
ate the special reasons for women's poverty; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION No. 67, CHILD CARE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR
WOMEN 5 (1981) (explaining that "role overload"--carrying the full burden of child
care and full time employment-saps energy and time, thus locking single mothers into
a cycle of low paying jobs, citing D. Burlage, Divorced and Separated Mothers: Com-
bining the Responsibilities of Breadwinning and Childrearing 209-11 (1978) (Ph. D.
diss., Harvard Univ.)).
338. The mean amount of child support paid nationally in 1981 to divorced
women with children (all numbers of children) was $2,220. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: SERIES P-23, No. 124,
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981 3 Table B (1983).
339. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 673, THE
FEMALE-MALE EARNINGS GAP: A REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS IssUEs 4-5
(1982); WOMEN'S WORK: UNDERVALUED, UNDERPAID, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
WORKING WOMEN (1982).
340. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1265-66
(1981).
61
Krauskopf: Krauskopf:  Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
fairness seem more appropriate than current norms of postdivorce self-suffi-
ciency for such women. One of the greatest inequities in the current law is the
almost punitive treatment of divorced wives after long-duration marriages.
They, like widows, deserve some form of survivor benefits.341
Theory, statutory language, and precedent will allow courts to utilize
maintenance in these ways. Hopefully, we will follow the path of compensation
rather than punishment for homemaking. Only if we eschew the social good of
homemaking and childrearing or ignore its economic effects and the intent of
the legislature, could we decide otherwise in good conscience.
341. Id. at 1267.
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